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Confidence in the justice system cannot be affirmed if any party is
free, wholly without explanation, to make a fundamental change in
its version of the facts between trials, and then conceal this change
from the final trier of the facts.'
When the government applied for a search warrant, the agent swearing to the
affidavit averred that a reliable informant reported that "Timmy" was selling
drugs out of the specified house. 2 Now William is charged with possession of
the drugs found in the basement of a house. 3 He claims that the drugs belong
to the homeowner's son, Timmy.4 Not surprisingly, William would like to tell
the jury what was in the affidavit for the search warrant.5 The trial court
excludes the evidence.
6
Rolando is charged with murder and the State seeks the death penalty. In the
first trial, the prosecution argues that the victim, a 10-year-old girl, was
murdered where her body was found on the Prairie Path.7 Rolando is
convicted and sentenced to death on this set of facts.' After that trial,
Dugan-another suspect who has no connection to Rolando-claims that he
alone committed the crime and that he murdered the girl on the Prairie Path.9
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to
all my colleagues for their helpful comments, particularly Louis Sirico. I am
indebted to Matthew Janssen, Michael Frankel, and Tammy Lander for their
research assistance, and to Villanova University School of Law for its
generous support.
1. United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991).
2. See United States v. Morgan, 581, F.2d 933, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 935-36.
5. Id.
6. Id. (holding that the statements should have been admitted).
7. See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 664-65 (Ill. 1994).
8. See id. at 639.
9. See id. at 664. Dugan was not prosecuted. See id. at 652. See
generally JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 175-80 (2000) (detailing this
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Meanwhile, Rolando wins a new trial.'0 At his second trial, he calls a witness
to testify to Dugan's statements, and he argues that Dugan committed the
murder." Adjusting to Rolando's defense, the prosecution alters its theory
and argues that the murder occurred elsewhere.' 2 Rolando wants to introduce
the prosecutor's prior statements, letting the new jury hear that in the first
trial the prosecution argued that the murder occurred exactly where Dugan
claims he committed it. The trial court refuses to admit the prosecutor's
statements from the first trial.13 Unaware of this change in the prosecution's
theory, the jury convicts Rolando again and sentences him to death. 14
Should the jury sitting in a criminal case learn that a
prosecutor or a law enforcement agent made statements
inconsistent with the prosecution's case against the defendant?
In a civil case, a party's contrary statement is generally
admissible as the admission of a party opponent.' 5 When the
government is a party, however, courts often resist admitting
statements of those who speak on its behalf.' 6 Most general
sources on the law of party admissions state that the
statements of government agents are not admissible as party
admissions in criminal cases. 17  Even though these sources
sometimes acknowledge questions about the fairness of or
justification for this application of the rule governing vicarious
admissions,18 courts cite these sources for the proposition that
case).
10. See Cruz, 643 N.E.2d at 639.
11. See id. at 645.
12. See id. at 664 (noting that the State argued Dugan was not credible).
13. See id. at 664-65 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not admitting evidence due to lack of binding authority).
14. See id. at 639 (noting that on initial review the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed).
15. See generally 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 254, at 135-37 (5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (noting that party
opponent admissions are generally excluded from the hearsay rule).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See, e.g., 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 801.23, at 178 (5th ed. 2001) ("However in a criminal prosecution,
government employees are apparently not considered agents or servants of a
party-opponent for the purpose of the admissions rules."); 2 MCCORMICK,
supra note 15, § 259, at 160 (commenting that "statements by agents of the
government are often held inadmissible against the government," particularly
those made at the investigative stage); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 819, at 204-
05 (1994) ("Statements by government agents and employees are not
admissible, substantively, against the government in criminal prosecutions.").
18. See 29A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 17, § 819, at 204-05 (noting doubt
about this application of the Federal Rules of Evidence); 3 GRAHAM, supra
note 17, § 801.23, at 178 n.ll (questioning this application).
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the rule does not admit the statements of government agents.' 9
Thus they perpetuate the narrow rule.
People v. Cruz,20 on which the second introductory
hypothetical is based, should prompt reconsideration of the
restriction on the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements
of the government.21 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed
Cruz's capital conviction, holding that the trial court acted
within its discretion in excluding the statements in this case.22
Much later, after Rolando Cruz had spent years in prison, his
innocence was conclusively established.23 As it turned out, the
case against him was built on inventive testimony and outright
lies.24 The prosecutor's shift in position could have raised a
warning flag if the court had admitted the prosecution's earlier
statements, allowing the jury to consider whether that shift
signaled an effort to make up for a deficient case. Perhaps that
evidentiary decision would have exposed the injustice sooner-
or prevented it entirely.
The justice system is currently evaluating how to respond
to documented instances of innocent defendants wrongfully
convicted and guilty defendants treated unfairly. If the
government is free to change its position without repercussions,
either as a case moves from investigation to trial or from trial
19. See People v. McDaniel, 647 N.E.2d 266, 272 (Ill. 1995) (citing 29A
AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 819, 204-05 (1994)); State v. Asbridge, 555 N.W.2d
571, 576 (N.D. 1996) (citing 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 259, at 168-69).
20. 643 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. 1994).
21. See Barry Tarlow, Limitations on the Prosecution's Ability to Make
Inconsistent Arguments in Successive Cases, CHAMPION, Dec. 1997, at 40, 42-
44 ("The infamous prosecution of Rolando Cruz, an Illinois man who spent 11
years on death row for a rape and murder that he did not commit, illustrates
the potential importance of the principles established in cases like Salerno
II.").
22. See Cruz, 643 N.E.2d at 665 (concluding that prosecutors' statements
are sometimes admissible but finding that the court did not abuse its
discretion because of lack of binding authority).
23. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 179 (discussing the case); Tarlow,
supra note 21, at 42 (detailing the State's evidence, including a DNA sample,
which did not implicate defendant).
24. Rather than recognizing a possible problem with the case against
Cruz, the Supreme Court of Illinois expressed regret and noted the
unfortunate impact of reversal on the victim's family. See Cruz, 643 N.E.2d at
667. When the corruption in the prosecution of the case was later uncovered,
Cruz was released from death row. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 180.
The case ultimately led to a civil suit against several law enforcement officers
and prosecutors on the basis of their deceit and manipulation of evidence. Id.
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to trial, unfair trials and improper convictions may result.25
Exposing the jury to the statements of government agents
favorable to the defendant represents one step toward
preventing such results. 26
Party admissions can offer a uniquely valuable insight into
a case. 27 Like a corporation, the government speaks and acts
only through its agents. In criminal cases, those agents are
responsible for investigating the case, developing evidence for
trial, exercising prosecutorial discretion, formulating the
government's theory, and representing the government in
dealings with the defendant and the court.28 If a government
agent at one of these stages articulates a position that is
favorable to the defendant at trial, the defendant should be
allowed to inform the jury of that statement. If an innocent
explanation exists, the prosecution may advance that
explanation, inviting the jury to accord little weight to the
agent's statement. In some cases, however, as in Cruz, the
inconsistency reflects governmental impropriety or weakness in
the government's case.
Party admissions do not bind the government, but they are
powerful evidence. Proof that the government previously
advanced a position inconsistent with its current posture is
likely to capture the jury's attention. If the statement is not
admissible as a party admission, its impact is severely
curtailed. Although the defense attorney may still be able to
use it as a basis for questions on cross-examination or employ it
as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the witness, the
evidence may not be admissible at all and, even if admitted,
will have a limited role.29 Of course, the opportunity to cross-
25. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV.
1423, 1477 (2001).
26. I have argued elsewhere that this step does not provide sufficient
protection and that the courts should implement stronger measures. See id. at
1443, 1477-78. Nevertheless, informing the jury of the government's change in
position may protect against unfair results in some cases.
27. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 575 F. Supp. 718, 724 (D. Kan. 1983)
(commenting that in a large company with fragmented responsibility for
decision making, essential information may be found only in communications
within the corporation at the critical time).
28. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.3, at 7-25 (3d
ed. 2000).
29. If limited to impeachment use, the statement will not be admissible at
all unless the person who made the statement testifies; even in that case, the
jury will normally only be permitted to consider the evidence to assess the
404 [Vol. 87:401
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examine or impeach with the statement will arise only if the
prosecution calls as a witness the person who made the
statement; if the prosecution knows the statement exists, it
may choose not to call the witness at all. Furthermore, the jury
will not be allowed to consider the truth of the statements if the
defendant can only cross-examine the government witness on
the basis of the prior statement or impeach the witness with
the statement.30 Neither approach allows or invites the jury to
believe the statement itself and use it as evidence favorable to
the defendant. 31 Only admitting the statement as a party
admission permits such favorable use.
The rule governing party admissions is a well accepted
principle of evidence law. The rule allows a party's adversary
to introduce into evidence over a hearsay objection both the
party's own words and statements attributable to the party.
32
In the Federal Rules of Evidence, this doctrine is embodied in
Rule 801(d)(2); the states have adopted similar rules. 33 Rather
than a single umbrella rule, the party admission rule consists
of five distinct subsections: individual admissions, statements
credibility of the witness. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 34, at 126-27
(noting that prior inconsistent statements admitted only to impeach a witness
will often be inadmissible as substantive evidence of the facts stated and can
only be used to evaluate the credibility of in-court testimony).
30. See United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring
to party admissions as "the trial equivalent of a deadly weapon"). But see
United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir. 1990) (suggesting that
the defendant was adequately protected by cross-examining government
witnesses on the basis of their statements); United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d
177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (suggesting that statements be limited to
impeachment).
31. When the statement is admitted for such limited purposes the defense
is not permitted to argue that the jury should believe the statement, so the
defendant cannot build a narrative around the government's shift in position.
The defense can only use the statement to attack the credibility of the witness
who made the statement. See supra note 29.
32. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 254, at
135-39. It is important to note that Rule 801(d)(2) only overcomes a hearsay
objection. The government is free to argue that the statements offered by the
defendant are inadmissible on other grounds, such as irrelevance or lack of
authentication, or that, while admissible, the statements should not be given
much weight. See United States v. Woo, 917 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (noting that party admissions were properly excluded as unfairly
prejudicial and confusing); United States v. AT&T Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 358
n.14 (D.D.C. 1980).
33. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); N.J. R.
EVID. 803(b); VT. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Texas Rules of
Evidence Handbook: Article VIII: Hearsay, 30 HOuS. L. REV. 897, 936-50
(1993) (discussing the adoption of Rule 801(d)(2) in Texas).
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adopted by the party, statements made by an agent with
authority and offered against the principal, statements made
by an agent concerning matters within the scope of the agent's
duties, and co-conspirators' statements.34 In a criminal case,
the prosecution can employ each of these five sub-rules to
introduce out-of-court statements against the defendant. 35
Indeed, the expansive prosecutorial use of the exception for co-
conspirators' statements, a form of party admission, has been
well documented and critiqued. 36
In contrast, the bases for admitting statements against the
government are more circumscribed. In theory, the criminal
defendant should have three available party admission
justifications. First, in appropriate cases, the defendant should
be able to argue that the government adopted statements,
making them admissible as adoptive admissions.37 Second,
when the defendant can demonstrate that the declarant was
authorized to speak for the government, the statements should
fall within the traditional definition of vicarious admissions.38
Finally, even when the defendant cannot demonstrate the
declarant's authority to speak, if the defendant can
demonstrate that the declarant was an agent of the
government and spoke about matters within the scope of the
declarant's responsibilities, then the statements should be
34. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see also 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17,
§ 801.15, at 132-40.
35. See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1419-21 (9th Cir. 1995)
(admitting drug ledgers against the defendant on the grounds that defendant
made or adopted them); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 778-79 (1st
Cir. 1995) (admitting statements as co-conspirator statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 734-35 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(rejecting defendant's argument to limit Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because it would
require "a hyper-technical construction of the rule" and admitting vicarious
admission against defendant); United States v. Hutchins, 818 F.2d 322, 327-28
(5th Cir. 1987) (admitting defendant's statement as an admission under Rule
801(d)(2)(A)); United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 945-46 (8th Cir. 1976)
(holding defendant's attorney's statements admissible as authorized party
admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(C)).
36. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Of Evidence and Equal Protection:
The Unconstitutionality of Excluding Government Agents' Statements Offered
as Vicarious Admissions Against the Prosecution, 71 MINN. L. REV. 269, 271
(1986) ("Vicarious admissions are admitted against the party-opponent on the
theory that, given the party's close relationship with the third party, it is fair
to impute the statement to the party-opponent.").
37. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
38. See id. 801(d)(2)(C).
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admitted as an unauthorized vicarious admission.39 Often,
however, courts exclude governmental statements offered by
the defendant even though they fall within one of these three
categories of party admissions.
The application of the party admissions doctrine to
statements offered against the government deserves closer
consideration than it has received. The rules are not applied to
statements by government agents in a consistent or coherent
manner, and the law governing the use of party admissions
against the prosecution is neither uniform nor well developed.
40
Courts usually refuse to allow defendants to inform the jury of
the favorable statement of a government agent by excluding the
evidence as inadmissible hearsay.41 Some courts have rebuffed
defendants' efforts to admit inconsistent governmental
statements by invoking "the common law principle that no
individual should be able to bind the sovereign."42 Even when
courts admit statements as governmental party admissions,
they often do so with muddled or unclear reasoning and
39. See id. 801(d)(2)(D).
40. See 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.33[31, at 801-72 to 801-73 (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., 2d ed. 2002). Even when courts recognize that prosecutors' statements
may fall within Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), they do not appear to
agree about which particular provision of the rule applies. See id. § 801.33[3],
at 801-73 n.23. Courts variously rely upon subsections (A), (B), (C), and (D).
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying
on McKeon admittance of defense counsel's prior statements as party
admissions under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) and (C) to rule that
the prosecution's opening statement from the prior trial is admissible), rev'd
on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118,
130 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that at least the Justice Department, if not every
federal agency, is a party-opponent in criminal cases under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(A)); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1262 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an investigative report prepared by the prosecutor's office was
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D)); United States v.
Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that the government
manifested its belief in an informant's statements under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) when it indicated in a sworn affidavit for a search
warrant that it believed the informant's statements were trustworthy).
41. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1351 n.4 (7th Cir.
1997) (rejecting the argument that the prosecutor's statements fall within
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)); State v. Brown, 784 A.2d 1244, 1255 (N.J.
2001) (holding that a law enforcement officer's statement in a sworn affidavit
was inadmissible as a party admission); see also United States v. Santos, 372
F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (refusing to admit statements as party
admissions).
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thereby generate confusion for future decisions. 43
This Article seeks to eliminate that confusion. The Article
examines the appropriate role of party admissions in criminal
cases and proposes a comprehensive analytical approach to the
admission of statements attributable to the government as
party admissions. Part I summarizes the law governing party
admissions before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975. Part II notes the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which expanded the categories of admissible
party admissions and recognized no special rule for government
admissions. This Part of the Article also documents the
continued resistance to admitting party admissions against the
prosecution under the modern rules of evidence. Part III
examines in detail the way in which the rules governing party
admissions should apply to governmental admissions,
advocating a reading of the rule that is receptive to informing
the jury of the government's change in position on matters
relevant to a criminal case. The subsections of Part III discuss
the manner in which the requirements of the subsections of the
rule governing adoptive admissions and vicarious admissions
should apply to statements made or adopted by government
agents. The Article concludes that a fair application of the rule
on party admissions does not allow the government in a
criminal case to conceal from the jury a change in position that
is favorable to the defendant. Instead, it would permit the
criminal defendant to introduce a wide range of government
statements to demonstrate to the jury that the government
espoused inconsistent positions, possibly casting doubt on the
defendant's guilt.
I. THE LAW OF PARTY ADMISSIONS BEFORE THE
FEDERAL RULES
The admissibility of party admissions against parties other
than the government is well established. The origin of the rule
admitting party admissions lies in the doctrine estopping a
party from asserting in court a position inconsistent with a
position previously advanced in a formal setting, as in the
pleadings or in a stipulation.4 The rules governing party
43. See supra note 40; infra Part III.A.3.
44. See Edmund M. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181, 181
(1937) [hereinafter Morgan, Admissions]. That doctrine is now embodied in
the law of judicial admissions, which bar the party altogether from asserting
the inconsistent position. Judicial admissions are "formal concessions in the
408 [Vol. 87:401
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admissions, however, are merely rules of evidence, and they
extend to all statements of a party, whether formal or
informal. 45 So although party admissions are not binding on
the party, they are admissible as evidence over a hearsay
objection, and the jury may consider them for the truth of what
they assert.
Party admissions have long been admissible in evidence
and exempt from the usual requirements imposed on
admissible hearsay. Historically, party admissions were
admissible even when the guarantees of trustworthiness that
underlie the other hearsay exceptions were lacking.46 A party
admission did not need to be shown to be reliable and could
actually have been self-serving when made. 47 Moreover, a
pleadings in the case or stipulations by a party or counsel that have the effect
of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof
of the fact." 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 254, at 137-38. A judicial
admission is conclusive in a case unless a court allows it to be withdrawn. See
id.; see also Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995)
(contrasting the conclusiveness of judicial admissions with the ability of a
party to controvert or explain evidentiary admissions).
45. See United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1540, 1564
(E.D. Tex. 1986) (distinguishing between evidentiary and binding use of
statements), affd, 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v.
Blood, 806 F.2d 1218, 1221 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986) (illustrating the confusion
between evidentiary admissions and judicial admissions). In Blood, the
defendant claimed that certain plans were not ERISA plans, as charged, but
were insurance plans. See id. at 1220-21. During the government's opening
argument and in proposed voir dire questions, the prosecutor referred to the
plans as insurance plans. See id. at 1219, 1221. The defendant argued that
the court should treat the matter as established, by treating the statements as
judicial admissions. See id. at 1220. Since the statement was made to the
jury in the case, Rule 801(d)(2) had no possible role; there was no need to
introduce evidence that the prosecutor had made the statements. Id. at 1221.
Nevertheless, in rejecting the defendant's argument because the statements
were not sufficiently factual, the court discussed party admissions and cited
authority dealing only with party admissions. Id. In addition, the court noted
that it was not going to address the distinction between judicial and
evidentiary admissions. See id. at 1221 n.2. See generally Ediberto Roman,
"Your Honor What I Meant to State Was...:" A Comparative Analysis of the
Judicial and Evidentiary Admission Doctrines as Applied to Counsel
Statements in Pleadings, Open Court, and Memoranda of Law, 22 PEPP. L.
REV. 981, 993-1004 (1995) (analyzing the law of party admissions as applied to
statements in pleadings, open court, and memoranda of law).
46. See John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 564, 573 (1937); see also Morgan, Admissions,
supra note 44, at 183 ("Every danger that cross-examination tends to guard
against is positively shown to be present in full force.").
47. See Morgan, Admissions, supra note 44, at 182; Strahorn, supra note
46, at 575 ("[Tlhe admission need not be against interest when made .... ).
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party admission was competent evidence even when the
declarant lacked personal knowledge of the facts asserted. 48
As the law of evidence developed, the rationale for
admitting party admissions was debated at length.49 Some
advocated viewing party admissions not as hearsay but as
conduct of the party inconsistent with their contention in the
litigation. 50 Eventually, however, it became accepted that the
party admission rule is based on fairness in an adversarial
setting. On this theory, it is simply considered fair to permit a
party to introduce, against its adversary, words attributable to
that adversary. Professor Morgan, an early spokesperson for
this position, articulated the rationale that continues to
support the admissibility of party admissions over a hearsay
objection:
A litigant can scarcely complain if the court refuses to take seriously
his allegation that his extra-judicial statements are so little worthy of
credence that the trier of fact should not even consider them. He can
hardly be heard to object that he was not under oath or that he had
no opportunity to cross-examine himself.5'
In 1937, Professor Morgan stated,
[01ften [an admission] hasn't even an attenuated guaranty of
trustworthiness. It stands in a class by itself; the theory of its
admissibility has not the remotest connection with the jury system
and can be explained only as a corollary of our adversary system of
litigation. 5
2
The view that a party is responsible for its words as well as
actions supports admitting party admissions.53
The common law allowed statements to be admitted
against corporations and other non-human entity parties as
party admissions if the statement was either authorized or
adopted by the entity against which it was offered.54 Vicarious
48. See Morgan, Admissions, supra note 44, at 183.
49. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp.
1190, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting departures from common law), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574
(1986); Strahorn, supra note 46, 569-79 (discussing various theories advanced
to support admitting party admissions); Richard D. Geiger, Note, Vicarious
Admissions by Agents of the Government: Defining the Scope of Admissibility
in Criminal Cases, 59 B.U. L. REV. 400, 402 (1979).
50. Strahorn, supra note 46, at 572-73.
51. Edmund M. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 461, 461 (1929) [hereinafter Morgan, Vicarious Admissions]; see also
Geiger, supra note 49, at 402-04.
52. Morgan, Admissions, supra note 44, at 182.
53. See Geiger, supra note 49, at 403.
54. See Morgan, Vicarious Admissions, supra note 51, at 462-63.
(Vol. 87:401
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admissions, which are the statements of an agent that are
admissible against the agent's principal, posed a particular
challenge to courts; many government admissions could fall
within this category. Normal hearsay protections, including
indicia of reliability and the requirement that the declarant
have personal knowledge, are required if out-of-court-
statements of third parties are to be admitted unless "some
doctrine of vicarious liability intervenes."55 Working on the
premise that the party's own words constituted party
admissions, the law treated either authorization or adoption as
sufficient to put the third party's words in the same status as
the party's own words.56  As to authorized statements,
Professor Morgan remarked, "[i]f B authorizes A to speak for
him, he can take no valid exception to the reception of A's
statements against him which he could not take to the
reception of his own."57
The law was equally clear, however, that if the agent's
statement was neither authorized nor adopted, it would not be
admitted as a vicarious admission. 58  State v. Smith59
illustrates how the pre-rules requirement of authorization
worked in criminal cases. In Smith, the defendant tried to
introduce the statement of an officer who arrested him shortly
55. Id. at 461-62. Professor Strahorn argued that vicarious admissions
warranted admissibility as relevant conduct if vicarious responsibility existed.
Strahorn, supra note 46, at 582-83.
56. See Strahorn, supra note 46, at 582.
57. Morgan, Vicarious Admissions, supra note 51, at 463.
58. See, e.g., N. Oil Co. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 347 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir.
1965) (identifying as the prevailing position the requirement of authorization
to speak for the principal); United States v. Foster, 131 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir.
1942) (declining to admit the statement of the Secretary of War because it was
not authorized); Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 636 (9th Cir.
1942) (holding a letter to be properly excluded because it was not shown to be
authorized by the board); see also 2 EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 236 (Honorable Charles E. Clark ed., 1957) ("It is necessary to
distinguish sharply between authority to do an act or to deal with a specified
matter and authority to talk about it. The latter is usually a requisite of
admissibility of statements made by the agent."); Morgan, Admissions, supra
note 44, at 191-204 (summarizing the relationship between the laws of
vicarious liability and the rules governing the admissibility of an agent's
declarations against the principal and stressing that only authorized
statements were admissible as the principal's party admissions); Morgan,
Vicarious Admissions, supra note 51, at 464 (expressing the prevailing
common law view and emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between
"authority to do an act and authority to talk about it").
59. 153 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. 1967).
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after a burglary. 60 The officer stated that "the person who
broke into the place must have got cut."6' The court concluded
that even if the officer was an agent of the state, he was not
authorized to speak for the state and that therefore the
statement was not admissible as a vicarious admission.62 The
Smith court applied the classic distinction between the agent
authorized to act and the agent authorized to speak for the
principal. 63 Of course, the agent authorized to act will talk in
the course of carrying out various duties, but those statements
are not viewed as authorized by the principal. Therefore, at
common law, they could not be introduced against the principal
as party admissions.
The rationale for admitting adopted statements and
authorized statements against other entities could extend to
party admissions offered against the prosecution.
Nevertheless, party admissions were almost never admitted
against the government in criminal cases.64  The rules
governing party admissions were construed narrowly even
when a criminal defendant offered a statement against the
prosecution that appeared to fall within the rule.65 Even if a
statement appeared to be authorized or adopted by the
government, the courts would usually exclude it.66 The most
influential pre-Rules decision considering the admissibility of
party admissions against the government is United States v.
Santos.67  In Santos, a criminal defendant charged with
assaulting a federal officer argued that the trial court should
have admitted the prior statement of a narcotics agent as the
government's admission. The agent's statement was contained
in a sworn affidavit supporting a complaint and identified
someone other than the defendant as the assailant.68 The court
60. Id. at 540-41.
61. Id. at 543.
62. See id.
63. See id. (concluding that a municipal police officer is not an agent of the
state in its adversary capacity as a party in a criminal prosecution).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1967).
65. See generally Irving Younger, Sovereign Admissions: A Comment on
United States v. Santos, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 108, 110-14 (1968) (describing the
rejection of such statements by several courts).
66. See, e.g., Santos, 372 F.2d at 180-81 (excluding a sworn statement by a
government agent that the agent was authorized to file with the court).
67. 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Younger, supra note 65, at
110-15 (criticizing the decision).
68. Santos, 372 F.2d at 179.
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rejected the defendant's argument, offering two explanations.
First, the court stated,
Though a government prosecution is an exemplification of the
adversary process, nevertheless, when the Government prosecutes, it
prosecutes on behalf of all the people of the United States; therefore
all persons, whether law enforcement agents, government
investigators, complaining prosecution witnesses, or the like, who
testify on behalf of the prosecution, and who, because of an
employment relation or other personal interest in the outcome of the
prosecution, may happen to be inseparably connected with the
government side of the adversary process, stand in relation to the
United States and in relation to the defendant no differently from
persons unconnected with the effective development of or furtherance
of the success of, the prosecution.
69
Second, despite this very broad view of those associated
with the government in its role as prosecutor, the court went on
to address the narrower agency issues raised by the defendant's
argument. The court noted that it is unfair to allow statements
of the defendant's agents to be admitted against the criminal
defendant while limiting statements of federal agents to
impeachment use.70 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
difference was justified, reasoning that federal agents not only
are "supposedly uninterested personally in the outcome of the
trial" but also are "historically unable to bind the sovereign."71
Thus, even though the agent had filed the sworn document in
court, arguably adopting it, and had been authorized by the
government to prepare it, the court did not treat the statement
as a party admission. 72
Smith and Santos represented the prevailing view at
common law. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were
adopted and did not contain any limitation on using party
admissions against the government, one might have hoped that
the courts would relax the barriers and allow the defendants to
introduce the government's statements against it.73 That did
69. Santos, 372 F.2d at 180.
70. Id.
71. Id. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 36, at 307-09 (arguing that
agents are interested actors).
72. Santos, 372 F.2d at 181 ("[Tlhese statements are not admissible
against the Government .... ).
73. One could argue to the contrary that, because Rule 801(d)(2)(D) had
no common law counterpart, the maxim that a statute should not be construed
in derogation of the common law should operate. See infra Part II; see also
Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 253, 255 (N.Y. 1994) ("It is
axiomatic concerning legislative enactments in derogation of common law...
they are deemed to abrogate the common law only to the extent required by
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not happen.
II. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND RESISTANCE TO
ADMITTING PARTY ADMISSIONS
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which define party admissions as non-hearsay under Rule
801(d)(2). Similar rules have been enacted in most states.74
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) contains five subsections.
Like the common law, the rule does not rest on assessments of
the trustworthiness of the statements and does not require that
the declarant have personal knowledge. 75 Three subsections of
Rule 801(d)(2) offer avenues for introducing the statements
against an entity like the government that speaks only through
individuals who act for it.76  Adoptive admissions are
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), which provides that a third
party's statement adopted by a party is admissible against the
party as a party admission. 77 Authorized admissions are
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C), 78 which establishes that
the statements of one whom the party authorized to speak for it
are admissible. Although these two subsections of the party
admission rule have strong common law credentials, subsection
(D) does not. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) admits non-authorized
vicarious admissions, treating the statements of agents who
were authorized to act but not to speak as the principal's party
the clear import of the statutory language." (citations omitted) (citing Psota v.
Long Island R.R., 159 N.E. 180, 181 (N.Y. 1927))); NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12, at 101-02 (6th ed. 2000)
("Courts should not presume that the legislature in the enactment of a statute
intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless that intention is
made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary
implication."). Of course, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) expressly provides for statements
that were not admissible at common law, so it would be difficult not to read it
in derogation of the common law.
74. See supra note 33.
75. See Osterneck v. E. T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 327, 332 (N.D.
Ga. 1984) (relying on the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)).
76. Two other subsections offer no utility for the criminal defendant. Rule
801(d)(2)(A) defines the statements of the party as non-hearsay; it targets the
statements of individuals who are parties and therefore should not apply
against an entity party like the government or a corporation. Rule
801(d)(2)(E) admits statements of co-conspirators against one who is a
member of a conspiracy. It would not operate against the government in a
criminal case.
77. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
78. Id. 801(d)(2)(C).
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admissions.79 This provision represents a significant departure
from the common law.8 0 This subsection of the rule admits the
statements of a party's agent. not authorized to speak but
speaking about matters that fall within the scope of the agency
as the admissions of the principal. Each of these subsections of
the rule should be applied against the government in criminal
cases as well as in civil actions.
Rule 801(d)(2) itself provides no support for the argument
that party admissions operate differently against the
government; it contains no language whatsoever that targets
statements made or adopted by government agents.81 Despite
the seemingly clear language of the rule, however, some courts
continue to resist admitting party admissions against the
government, particularly in criminal cases. 82 Even though the
courts note that neither Rule 801(d)(2) nor the Advisory
Committee's notes on the rule express an exception for the
government,8 3 they have not consistently applied the rule to
admit statements against the government and have failed to
evaluate carefully the application of the rule to statements
attributable to the government.8 4
Santos and other pre-Rules decisions accurately reflected
the law of vicarious admissions when they were decided; the
admissibility of vicarious admissions generally turned on the
79. Id. 801(d)(2)(D).
80. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp.
1190, 1239, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Chicago v.
Greer, 76 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1869) (recognizing that statement of authorized
agent was admissible against city); Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 1245
(describing Rule 801(d)(2)(C) as codifying common law); CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.32, at 1125 (2d ed. 1999)
("Traditionally being an employee or agent did not make one's statements,
even those relating to one's duties, admissible against the employer or
principal because such status did not confer speaking authority."); David J.
Wallman, Employees'Admissions in New York: Time for a Change, 11 TOURO
L. REV. 231, 241-48 (1994) (comparing Rule 801(d)(2)(D) to the common law).
81. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and
the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 774-78 (1990) (arguing
that the plain meaning of rules would inappropriately admit vicarious
admissions against the government that have traditionally been excluded).
82. See generally id. at 776-77 (discussing cases which reject such
admissions).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
("Moreover, there is nothing in the history of the Rules generally or in Rule
801(d)(2)(B) particularly to suggest that it does not apply to the prosecution in
criminal cases.").
84. See supra note 40.
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speaker's authority to speak and therefore was closely tied to
the law of vicarious responsibility.8 5 Courts in jurisdictions
that have adopted the modern rule of party admissions,
however, continue to cite Santos for the proposition that the
law does not allow party admissions into evidence against the
government.8 6
In United States v. Kampiles,87 for example, the defendant
was charged with delivering top secret material, including a
particular handbook, to a foreign agent.88 The defendant
sought to introduce the statement of a Central Intelligence
Agency senior watch officer. 89 In the offered statement, the
watch officer said that he had never seen that handbook in the
office where he and the defendant both worked. 90 The evidence
would have supported the defendant's claim that he never had
the handbook. The officer-declarant was unquestionably an
agent of the United States at the time he made the statement,
and the statement appeared to concern matters within the
scope of his agency. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, however, cited Santos and rejected the defendant's
argument that the statements of a government employee fell
within Rule 801(d)(2) as the admissions of a party's servant.91
The court adopted Santos's reasoning that the agents were both
disinterested and traditionally unable to bind the sovereign,
and then went on to state that statements of government
agents "seem less the product of the adversary process and
85. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir.
1979) (noting from Santos that Government agents are disinterested in the
outcome of the trial and traditionally cannot bind the sovereign); United
States v. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (D. Conn. 1987) ("Although Santos
was decided prior to enactment of the Federal Rules, the Court finds nothing
in Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), the Advisory Committee notes, or recent Court
decisions which would alter the Santos rule." (citations omitted)) affd, 835
F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987); State v. Jurgensen, 681 A.2d 981, 986 (Conn. App. Ct.
1996) (quoting Santos); State v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986, 992 (Me. 1984)
(citing Santos as explaining why a police laboratory report should not be
admitted under the party admissions rule); State v. Brown, 784 A.2d 1244,
1255 (N.J. 2001); see also Geiger, supra note 49, at 420 (arguing that Santos is
consistent with Rule 801(d)(2)). See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 36, at
279 ("Although the Santos decision predates the Federal Rules of Evidence,
courts continue to adhere to its holding.").
87. 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979).
88. Id. at 1234-35.
89. Id. at 1245-46.
90. Id. at 1246.
91. Id.
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hence less appropriately described as admissions of a party."92
The reasoning of Kampiles and similar cases is unsound.
It does not respond to the rule's requirements for admissibility
of party admissions or the reality of the ways in which agents
act for the government. Nothing in Rule 801(d)(2) requires that
a party admission be generated as part of the adversarial
process. The rule turns only on the adversarial way in which
the statements are used at trial. Party admissions are often
made before litigation is even a prospect.93 Moreover, the rule
92. Id. The Kampiles court noted an additional argument to support its
narrow reading of Rule 801(d)(2)(D), stating that a broad reading of that rule
would render Rule 803(8), the exception for public records, unnecessary. Id. at
1246 n.16. The court overstated the relationship between the two rules. Even
if Rule 801(d)(2) allows a criminal defendant to admit public records against
the government in a criminal case, Rule 803(8) would still govern offers of
public records against any party other than the government in civil or criminal
cases. While the two rules overlap, they are not coextensive.
One aspect of the relationship between Rule 801(d)(2) and Rule 803(8),
however, warrants consideration. Rule 803(8)(B) defines public records as
those that set forth "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report" but excludes in criminal cases
"matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel."
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B). The government could therefore argue that the
official report is excluded from the public records exception in criminal cases
and that the defendant should not be permitted to circumvent the limitation in
Rule 803(8)(B) by turning to Rule 801(d)(2). A similar argument defeated the
prosecution in United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir. 1977). In Oates,
the prosecution overcame the defendant's hearsay objection to a chemist's
report by characterizing it as a business record and introducing it under Rule
803(6); by doing so, the government avoided the restriction in Rule 803(8)(B)
and (C) against use of public records in criminal cases. On appeal, however,
the Second Circuit held that the government could not circumvent the
legislative intent expressed in Rule 803(8) in this way. Id. at 68. This
reasoning should not extend to the use of Rule 801(d)(2) by the criminal
defendant. In limiting Rule 803(8) in criminal cases, Congress was primarily
concerned with protecting the defendant's right to confrontation and limiting
the advantage the prosecution might obtain if it could introduce its routinely
prepared records against the defendant. See id. at 68-72; see also United
States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Grady, 544
F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976). Despite the ambiguous language of Rule
803(8)(B), defendants in criminal cases may introduce government records
that fall within this rule. See United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 967-68
(D.C. Cir. 1975); 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 803.8, at 411 n.19.
93. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (illustrating that the
officer's statement that "the person who broke into the place must have got
cut" was made shortly after the arrest); see also United States v. Agne, 214
F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2000) (statements made during negotiation of a letter
of credit); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 561 (11th
Cir. 1998) (statements concerning pricing arrangements); MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983)
(statements in a corporation's internal report).
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is unconcerned with the speaker's perception or the context in
which the statement was made. 94  There is clearly no
requirement that the declarant have perceived the statement to
be against her own interest or that of the principal for whom
she spoke or worked.
Courts that perpetuate common law limitations on the use
of party admissions against the prosecution overlook three
aspects of the modern law of party admissions codified in Rule
801(d)(2). First, they do not consider whether adoptive
admissions should be admissible against the government and
do not evaluate what government conduct might adopt a
statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). 95 Second, they do not
recognize the admissibility of authorized admissions against
the government and therefore overlook the significance of
authority to speak for the government. 96  Finally, they
disregard the radical change Rule 801(d)(2)(D) injected into the
law governing party admissions and do not apply the expanded
rule admitting non-authorized vicarious admissions against the
government. 97
III. APPLYING RULE 801(d)(2)
Courts should overcome their reluctance to give criminal
defendants the benefit of Rule 801(d)(2). They should apply the
rule to statements of government agents in criminal cases in
the same way they apply it to statements of the agents of other
non-human entities. This would allow defendants to inform the
jury that the government is talking out of both sides of its
mouth, and possibly reduce the chance of an unjust conviction.
Three provisions of Rule 801(d)(2) may operate to admit
statements against the government in criminal cases. Each of
the provisions has distinct requirements and is considered
separately below. Section A considers Rule 801(d)(2)(B), under
which the defendant may establish that the government
adopted the statement. Section B considers Rule 801(d)(2)(C),
under which the defendant may establish that the declarant
was authorized to speak for the government. Section C
94. See Imwinkelried, supra note 36, at 304. But see Geiger, supra note
49, at 401 (arguing that admissions should be admitted against the
government only when the declarant's interests are substantially identical to
the principal's).
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considers Rule 801(d)(2)(D), the most controversial of the
provisions, under which the defendant may demonstrate that
the declarant was an agent of the government speaking of
matters concerning that agent's duties.
A. RULE 801(d)(2)(B): ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS
Rule 801(d)(2)(B) defines as non-hearsay "a statement of
which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth."98 To introduce a statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), the
proponent must demonstrate that the party against whom it is
offered has adopted the statement, either through action or
through inaction. 99 While interesting questions concerning
adoption can arise when the party is an individual, 100 issues of
adoption become more complex when the party is an entity like
the government that speaks through many people. Courts
must consider both what constitutes adoption and who within
government has the authority to adopt. Section 1 discusses
what should serve as adoption by the government. It argues
first that the government should be deemed to have adopted a
statement if it is filed as a true statement with a court. It then
outlines other forms of governmental endorsement that should
be treated as adoption under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Section 2
suggests that any agent authorized to speak or to act for the
government may adopt a statement, making it a party
admission under the rule. Section 3 discusses how some courts
have inappropriately applied the reasoning of adoptive
admission to statements that should be treated as vicarious
admissions by government agents falling under Rule
801(d)(2)(C) or (D).
98. Id. 801(d)(2)(B).
99. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note ("Adoption or
acquiescence may be manifested in any appropriate manner.").
100. See United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that, by itself, a party hearing a statement and not denying it is not
sufficient to establish adoption by silence); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting "[t]he
Advisory Committee Notes to 801(d)(2)(B) recognize the possibility of an
adoption by silence and state that 'the theory is that the person would, under
the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence if untrue."'),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
475 U.S. 574 (1986); State v. Carlson, 808 P.2d 1002, 1005-06 (Or. 1991)
(discussing how to analyze an ambiguous act claimed to represent adoption);
Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 78-80 (1995)
(recognizing that some courts have refused to admit silence in the face of
overheard accusations while others courts have admitted such statements).
419
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1. Action Constituting Adoption
Adoption of another's statement can occur in various ways.
In some instances, adoption takes the form of an express
statement of agreement or endorsement. In many instances,
however, adoption is implicit in the party's response to the
statement. 101 If the party incorporates the statement in its own
statements or takes action on the third party statement, that
will be viewed as adoption and the statement will be admitted
as a party admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). 10 2 When the
government endorses a third party statement, particularly by
asking a court to rely on it, or when the government itself takes
action on a statement, that represents adoption by the
government, and Rule 801(d)(2)(B) should apply.
a. Filing with the Court as Adoption
Any third party statement contained in a document
submitted to the court on behalf of the government should be
treated as an adoptive admission. Filing a document in court
based on the statement of a third party represents at least
implicit adoption and in some instances may entail express
adoption.
Indeed, courts have been most receptive to applying Rule
801(d)(2)(B) in cases where the government has filed
documents in court that rest on the truth of a third party's
assertion. 10 3 In United States v. Morgan,10 4 for example, the
government obtained a search warrant to search a house. 10 5
The warrant was based on the affidavit of a detective who
swore in part that a "reliable informant" had told him that
101. See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, §§ 261-62, at 163-72
(discussing admissions by conduct).
102. See infra Part III.A.l.a-b.
103. See United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991)
("We think that the same considerations of fairness and maintaining the
integrity of the truth-seeking function of trials that led this Court to find that
opening statements of counsel and prior pleadings constitute admissions also
require that a prior inconsistent bill of particulars be considered an admission
by the government in an appropriate situation."); United States v. Woo, 917
F.2d 96, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (conceding that affidavit and grand
jury testimony fell within Rule 801(d)(2)(B)). But see United States v.
Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it did not admit the government's Prior Bill of
Particulars because the bill alleged no inconsistent facts).
104. 581 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The first hypothetical in this Article
was based on Morgan. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
105. Morgan, 581 F.2d at 934.
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"Timmy" was selling drugs from the location and that the
informant had purchased drugs under the detective's
surveillance, which the informant said he bought from
"Timmy."10 6 As a result of the raid to execute the search
warrant, the defendant, William Morgan, was arrested and
charged with a narcotics violation based in part on drugs and
cash found in the basement of the house. 107 At trial, Morgan
wanted the jury to hear the informant's assertions, vouched for
by the government, that Timmy was dealing out of this
house.' 0 8 Morgan hoped that these statements, taken with
evidence that the owner's son, Timmy, lived in the house,
would raise a reasonable doubt regarding his involvement with
the items found in the basement. 10 9 The court of appeals held
that the statements should have been admitted under Rule
801(d)(2)(B). 11° The government's sworn assertion that the
informant's statements were reliable manifested its belief in
their truth. 11
Morgan illustrates the emphasis that courts place on the
government's formal act of filing documents with the court.
The court in Morgan rejected the government's argument that
Rule 801(d)(2) simply does not apply to statements by the
government.112 Even though the court saw no policy reason for
a blanket limitation on the rule,"13 the court remarked that
statements falling under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), particularly those
which have been held out as trustworthy in a sworn statement
to the court, "stand on more solid ground than mere out-of-
court assertions by a government agent."' 14
In State v. Dreher,115 the court similarly stressed the
formality of the judicial filing. 16 The state submitted an
affidavit incorporating portions of a witness's statement in
order to obtain a search warrant."17  At trial, the defendant
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 935-36.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 938.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 937-38.
113. Id. at 937-38 & n.ll.
114. Id. at 938.
115. 695 A.2d 672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), abrogated by State v.
Brown, 784 A.2d 1244 (N.J. 2001).
116. Id. at 721.
117. Id. at 719.
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wanted the jury to hear the assertions in the affidavit, which
were inconsistent with aspects of the prosecution's case against
the defendant. ' 18  The court granted that the prosecution
should not be bound by every statement made by an agent, but
concluded that by submitting these statements to a judicial
officer in support of the warrant application the state had
adopted the statements, rendering them admissible as adoptive
admissions. "19
The New Jersey Supreme Court abrogated Dreher in State
v. Brown.' 20 In Brown, a law enforcement agent relied on a
confidential informant's statement to obtain a search
warrant. 121 The agent and informant reported two supervised
drug purchases, both from Brown's codefendant and
roommate.122 Brown wanted to introduce the statements in the
search warrant affidavit to support her claim that the drugs
found in the apartment belonged to her roommate and not to
her. 123
The Supreme Court held that the statements were properly
excluded.124 Unfortunately, the exclusion resulted in an unfair
process. The prosecution elected not to call the informant as a
witness at trial or even to disclose the informant's identity. 125
As a result, the defendant was unable to support her claim that
the codefendant was the drug owner with that factual
information; the government insulated the potentially
exculpatory information. Instead, at the two defendants' joint
trial, the jury simply heard each deny that the drugs were hers
118. Id. at 719-20.
119. Id. at 721. By asking whether the statements could "bind" the state,
the court misconceived the issue somewhat. The question in the case was
whether the defendant could use the statements as evidence, leaving the jury
free to consider them or reject them as having no significance. The defendant
was not asking that the state be bound to its earlier position, as it would be
had the court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See supra notes 44-45
and accompanying text.
120. 784 A.2d 1244 (N.J. 2001).
121. Id. at 1248.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1249.
124. Id. at 1250-57. At trial, the defendant argued that the statements
were admissible as statements against interest. Id. at 1249. It does not
appear that she advanced a party admissions argument. Id. at 1265-66. The
dissent, however, made that argument. Id. at 1265-66 (Stein, J., dissenting).
This argument prompted the majority to respond and abrogate Dreher. Id. at
1256-57.
125. Id. at 1250.
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and disbelieved and convicted both. 26
The court should have recognized that the state adopted
the statement by relying on it in the warrant application. The
state advanced the statement as reliable and worthy of belief
by the court by using it as a basis for authorizing a search
warrant. When the state later took an inconsistent position,
the defendant should have been permitted to inform the jury of
the earlier statement. 127
b. Other Forms of Adoption
In civil cases, courts have recognized as adoption action
less formal than filing with the court. The willingness to accept
a range of actions as adoption should be extended to criminal
cases. Any act that signifies endorsement should suffice as
adoption under Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
Signing off on a report should act as adoption. In Pillsbury
Co. v. Cleaver-Brooks Division of Aqua-Chem, Inc.,128 the court
held that an employee of the party-company adopted the report
by signing each page. 129 If someone with appropriate authority
in government signs off on a report, this should be an adoption
of the statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Like private sector
entities, the government may commission outside actors to
conduct tasks such as investigations and studies. If the outside
actor reports back to the governmental unit and the agent who
could have acted for the government expresses agreement, as
by signing off on the report, courts should regard that act as
adoption under Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
Distribution of third party statements, when done without
reservation and in a manner inviting reliance on them, also
acts as adoption. Providing documents in response to
126. Id. at 1248-49.
127. See infra Part III.D.3 for a response to the argument that statements
made or adopted by the government at an early stage of investigation should
not be admissible against the government.
128. 646 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 1217-18. In criminal cases, confessions written out by someone
else but signed by the defendant have been admitted as party admissions. See
United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
signed statement of a witness prepared by a Secret Service Agent during
questioning was admissible under 803(5)); United States v. Johnson, 529 F.2d
581, 584 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding the admission of the defendant's
statement, which a Secret Service Agent took down in longhand, and that the
defendant read and signed).
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interrogatories may constitute adoption. 130  Even holding
documents out as reliable in a less formal setting may
constitute adoption. In Wagstaff v. Protective Apparel Corp.,"31
for example, the court held that the defendant had manifested
adoption in newspaper articles discussing the defendant's
finances by reprinting and distributing those articles to those
with whom the defendant did business. 32 The defendant's
action held the statements out as accurate. 133 Similarly, if the
government holds a third party's statements out in this
manner, that should constitute adoption under Rule
801(d)(2)(B).
Taking action on a third party statement may likewise
manifest adoption. In Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma
City, 134 for example, the City Manager received a report from
the personnel department of the plaintiffs employer, the Metro
Transit Department, and then sought the employee's
resignation. 135  The City Manager invoked the report in
demanding the resignation, saying that the information
"seem[ed] to be substantiated." 136 The court held that the City
Manager's actions adopted the report.1 37 Similarly, in Pilgrim
v. Trustees of Tufts College,138 the plaintiff sought to introduce
130. See Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cantex Mfg. Co., 262 F.2d 63, 67
(5th Cir. 1958) (holding that the defendant's interrogatory answer admitted
the amount of plaintiffs loss); Brayton v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 205 F.2d
644, 646 (2d Cir. 1953) (affirming the admissibility of pretrial interrogatories
and defendant's answer); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 1190, 1244 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that written answers to
interrogatories can be admissions but are not conclusive), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986);
Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 954 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (admitting answers to interrogatories compiled from documents); see
also Gadaleta v. Nederlandsch-Amerekaansche Stoomvart, 291 F.2d 212, 213
(2d Cir. 1961) (noting that the court was correct in excluding statements
although "[a]nswers to interrogatories clearly may be utilized as admissions").
131. 760 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 1078.
133. Id.
134. 155 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
135. Id. at 1267.
136. See id. at 1268-69. In Wright-Simmons, the plaintiff might have been
able to rely on Rule 801(d)(2)(D). It appears likely that the personnel
employee and all those she interviewed in her investigation were employees of
the city who were speaking about matters within the scope of their duties. See
infra Part III.C.
137. Wright-Simmons, 155 F.3d at 1268.
138. 118 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 1997).
2002] PARTY ADMISSIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 425
a Grievance Committee's report.139 The court held that the
defendant manifested adoption of the report by implementing
its recommendations. 140 The court noted that the defendant did
so "without disclaimer."14 '
Although the courts should extend this concept of adoption
to criminal cases, they should exercise caution in doing so. The
mere action of initiating a criminal investigation should not be
viewed as governmental adoption of the statements of the
complainant, witness, or informant who prompted the
government action. Investigation is, by definition, a tentative
response which is conditioned on a lack of information.
Instead, the courts should require action that reflects
affirmation of specific statements.
There are thus a variety of ways in which the government
may adopt a third party's statement. When such adoption
occurs, the defendant should be permitted to introduce the
statement as the government's adoptive party admission.
2. Who Can Adopt Statements
Unlike the vicarious admissions rules, 142  the rule
governing adoptive admissions does not include an agency
requirement; the statement may be made by any declarant,
regardless of relationship to the party.143 Nevertheless, in the
case of adoption by an entity such as the government, only an
agent of the entity can effect the adoption. 144
Any agent who is authorized to speak for the government
should be able to effect adoption both explicitly and implicitly.
In Wright-Simmons, for example, the City Manager's action
sufficed to adopt the statements in question. 145 In Morgan,
139. Id. at 869.
140. Id. at 870.
141. Id. Simple failure to disavow a statement will not normally be
considered an adoption. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
142. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D).
143. See id. 801(d)(2)(B).
144. The relationship of specific agents to the government is discussed at
length in sections B and C below, so it will be treated only briefly here.
145. See Wright-Simmons"v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1268-
69 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the City Manager's firing of an employee
based on written statements about that employee rendered the statement
admissible).
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however, the court appeared to suggest a limitation. 146 The
court held that statements in an affidavit filed with the court
were adopted and were therefore admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(B), but noted that, in the -District of Columbia, search
warrant applications must be approved by a prosecutor.147 The
court also remarked that the agent's statements in the affidavit
supporting the warrant application represented the
government's position and were not "merely the views of its
agent."148
To suggest that only government attorneys can adopt
statements is to construe the rule too narrowly. For instance, if
law enforcement officers are authorized to submit documents
such as applications for search warrants to the court without
the approval of a government attorney, the submission itself
should suffice to establish the included statements as adoptive
admissions. Even if no government attorney signed off on the
warrant application in Morgan, the sworn statements of the
agent vouching for the reliability of the information from the
informant should render the statements admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(B) as statements in which the government, through
its agent, manifested its belief. The authority to speak on
behalf of the government, whether to a court or not, should
carry with it the authority to adopt statements, making them
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
Similarly, an agent authorized to act for the government
may adopt statements by action. In Wright-Simmons, the City
Manager had the authority to terminate the employee, so his
action was authorized and also served as governmental
adoption of the report. 49 Courts should admit statements
under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) when action was taken on that
statement because specific government action can indicate
adoption of that statement.
3. Misapplication of the Adoptive Admissions Rule
Courts appear to be more comfortable admitting adoptive
admissions against the government than recognizing vicarious
governmental admissions. Some courts have relied on adoption
146. See United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(holding that sworn statements "clearly stand on more solid ground than mere
out-of-court assertions by a government agent").,
147. Id. at 938 n.10.
148. Id.
149. See Wright-Simmons, 155 F.3d at 1268-69.
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arguments to admit statements uttered by government
agents-rather than third parties-and have applied the
adoptive admissions rule, Rule 801(d)(2)(B), to statements that
are actually vicarious admissions falling within Rule
801(d)(2)(C) or (D). Unfortunately, overreliance on adoptive
admission reasoning contributes to the narrow construction of
governmental party admissions, bypassing opportunities for
the court to clarify the application of the vicarious admissions
rules to statements made by government agents.
In United States v. Kattar,150 for example, the court
evaluated a sentencing memorandum and a brief filed by the
government in an earlier case as adoptive admissions under
Rule 801(d)(2)(B). 151  The court held that the Justice
Department "manifested its belief' in those statements by
submitting them to the courts for the truth of their contents
and that the statements were therefore admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(B). 152 Instead, the court should have admitted the
statements as authorized admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(C)
because the attorneys who prepared and filed the documents
were authorized to speak for the government.1 53
Similarly, in United States v. Warren,154 the court relied on
the adoptive admissions rule to admit the statements of an
agent contained in an affidavit. 155 The court should have
admitted the statements as vicarious admissions because the
agent was authorized to speak for the government in the
affidavit. 156 The statements also could have been admitted
under the non-authorized vicarious admissions rule, Rule
801(d)(2)(D), because the agent was an "agent" within the
meaning of the rule and the affidavit, recounting aspects of an
investigation, related to matters within the scope of the
agency. 157
150. 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988).
151. Id. at 130.
152. Id. at 131.
153. See infra Part III.B.2.a (arguing that statements made by attorneys
are generally admissible and that prosecutors' statements should likewise be
admissible).
154. 42 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
155. Id. at 655.
156. See id.
157. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (noting that a statement made "by the
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment made during the existence of the relationship" amounts to an
admission). The statements in question were most likely made by the officer
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In cases such as these, the courts' reliance on adoptive
admissions reasoning narrows the scope of governmental party
admissions. By emphasizing formal filing as adoption and
declining to explore the use of vicarious admissions against the
government, the courts impair the development of the law of
party admissions and restrict the scope of the rule as it is used
against the prosecution.
B. RULE 801(d)(2)(C): AUTHORIZED ADMISSIONS
Rule 801(d)(2)(C) defines statements of an agent with
authority to speak as party admissions of the principal.' 58
Many agents who act for the government or any other non-
human entity lack authority to speak for the principal, so their
statements are not admissible as authorized admissions. 159
Others, however, do have authority to speak for the entity. 160
To determine whether their statements are authorized
admissions within Rule 801(d)(2)(C), a court must determine
the extent of the authority. 61  Although some agents are
empowered to speak generally for the government, they more
commonly have authority to speak only on specific topics or
occasions. 162  If an agent for a principal other than the
government makes a statement within the scope of its
authority to speak for the entity, the statement is admissible
against the principal-entity as a party admission. 163 The rules
that apply to other entities should apply to statements made by
agents authorized to speak for the government. Section 1
acting as an agent because the statements were made under oath and
submitted to a magistrate. See Warren, 42 F.3d at 655.
158. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
159. See generally 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 801.22, at 163-66
(explaining the circumstances under which agent statements are admissible);
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 259, at 149-61 (explaining that statements
made by agents explicitly authorized to act as agents are admissible against
authorizing parties, but that absent explicit authorization, the admissibility of
statements made in the scope of employment is much less clear).
160. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 259, at 154-60 (explaining
that statements made by attorneys are sometimes admissible against the
client, statements made by partners are sometimes admissible against the
partnership, statements made by a coconspirator are sometimes admissible
against other conspirators, and statements made by an agent of an accused
are generally admissible against the accused).
161. See 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 801.22, at 163-64 (explaining that the
authority of an agent to speak for a subject must be determined in court).
162. See id. § 801.22, at 163-66 (explaining that the scope of employment
affects the admissibility of certain statements).
163. See id.
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below briefly reviews sources of authority to speak for the
government. Section 2 considers four types of governmental
statements made with authority that may be authorized
admissions within Rule 801(d)(2)(C): prosecutors' statements,
documents filed with the court, official publications, and
internal reports.
1. Sources of Authority
Authority to speak arises in a variety of ways and may be
express or implied. Determinations of which government
agents have authority should parallel the determinations of
authority to speak for non-governmental entities. A fair
application of the rule governing authorized admissions should
recognize that many agents have authority to speak for the
government.
A position may carry express or implied authority to speak.
For example, the president of a corporation has authority to
speak, 64 as does a party's attorney. 165 The heads of specific
subdivisions within government should similarly be viewed as
authorized to speak on matters falling within their domain. 166
The President has authority to speak for the Executive Branch.
The Attorney General has authority to speak for the
Department of Justice. Additional law enforcement personnel
164. See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 557
(11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding as hearsay witnesses' testimony concerning statements of chemical
distributor's president); California v. Celtor Chem. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 1481,
1486-87 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding the statements of a company president, who
was also the largest stockholder and a member of the board of directors,
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) without discussion); In re Commercial Oil
Serv., Inc., 88 B.R. 126, 128 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that written statements
that were within the scope of the company president's authority were
admissible); see also Kingsley v. Baker/Beech-Nut Corp., 546 F.2d 1136, 1140-
41 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a summary of a high ranking company officer
drawn up by an attorney at the request of the court was admissible). But see
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1519 (N.D. Ala.
1995) (recognizing that under Alabama law it is not assumed that corporation
presidents have authority to speak for corporation), affd in part, vacated in
part, rev'd in part, 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).
165. See United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
that statements made by an attorney acting as an attorney were admissible
when the statements were made within the scope of the attorney's authority).
166. The party offering the statement has the burden of demonstrating
that the authority exists. Authority will not necessarily be assumed from a job
title. See, e.g., Overton v. City of Harvey, 29 F. Supp. 2d 894, 905 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (noting that a description of the declarant as City Administrator was
insufficient to establish foundation under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D)).
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may fall into the category of those implicitly authorized to
speak. For example, if the police commissioner makes a public
statement on behalf of the department, that statement would
likewise be admissible as an authorized admission.
Alternatively, authority to speak may be express: An agent
may be hired or designated to speak for the principal. 167 Press
secretaries and other similar spokespersons for various
governmental departments have the authority to state official
positions of the department. If an authorized spokesperson
speaks for a governmental office, the spokesperson's statements
should be treated as the authorized admissions of the office.
An agent may be hired or designated as the spokesperson
on a limited subject or occasion. 168 Lawyers hired to appear in
court for the government fall into this category, acting as the
spokesperson in the case the attorney is handling, but having
no broad authority to speak for the government on other
matters.
2. Statements Made with Authority
a. Prosecutors' Statements as Party Admissions
A party's attorney is perhaps the clearest imaginable
example of an agent authorized to speak. 169 The prosecutor
167. See, e.g., Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a broker was authorized to act as broker and contact potential
buyers, and that telexes sent by that broker were therefore admissible);
Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
testimony of an expert witness hired to give a deposition for a principal was
admissible).
168. See, e.g., Zearley v. Ackerman, 116 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2000)
(holding that statements of a school district official deposed as the
superintendent's designee fell within Rule 801(d)(2)(C)); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding
that where witnesses were authorized to testify on specific topics, testimony
on other matters fell outside their authority under Rule 801(d)(2)(C)), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
169. See, e.g., United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that a pleading prepared by an attorney constitutes an admission by
"one presumptively authorized to speak for his principal" (quoting Kunglig
Jarnvagsstgrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir.
1929))); United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1981)
(noting that attorney statements may be admissible against the client);
Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. INS, 640 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1981) (examining
the binding nature of attorney statements made in the presence of the
defendant and with the defendant's authority); United States v. Ferreboeuf,
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acts as the government's formal representative to the court by
filing documents and making statements to the court. Not only
are prosecutors authorized to speak for the government in
criminal cases, but they can also unquestionably bind the
government on a range of legal matters through, for example,
stipulations and plea agreements. 70  Therefore, their
statements in other aspects of the case should be treated as
party admissions. Some courts are willing to admit such
statements.171 Others, however, express reluctance and either
refuse to admit the statements altogether or subject them to
special scrutiny.
This reluctance is hard to comprehend. Long before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts recognized
that attorneys speak for their clients and, therefore, that their
statements are admissible against the client and may in some
cases bind the client. 172  Despite the precedent treating
counsel's statements as the client's admissions in civil cases,
courts are hesitant to apply the rule in criminal cases. 1 73
632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the defendant was bound by
facts entered into the record and agreed to by defendant's counsel when made
in the presence of the defendant).
170. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (declaring
that the fulfillment of prosecutor's promise in return for a guilty plea is a
necessary safeguard for defendants); United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st
Cir. 1995) (finding that the government breached a binding plea agreement
with the defendant); United States v. Bakshinian, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1106
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that prosecutors have the power to bind the
government and do so when they enter into a plea agreement).
171. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 40, § 801.33[3], at 801-72 to
801-73 (stating that "some courts have indicated that Rule 801(d)(2)(D) may
be invoked against the government, particularly when dealing with
statements made by government attorneys" (footnotes omitted)); see also cases
cited supra note 40.
172. See, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263 (1880) (recognizing
the authority of a lawyer to speak for the client); Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1965) (recognizing that opening
statements made by the attorney were admissible). In some instances, the
attorney's statement was given preclusive effect. See, e.g., United States v.
Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (stating that Assistant United
States Attorneys can bind the United States with statements in court); see also
Dick v. United States, 40 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1930) (pointing to appellant's
silence when his attorney conceded pertinent facts of the case as proof of
purposeful admission); Roman, supra note 45, at 997-98 (examining the
conclusive effect of admissions made in an amended pleading in which only
added allegations were made).
173. See, e.g, United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (11th Cir.
1994) (per curiam) (affirming a lower court's decision to exclude statements
made by an attorney during closing arguments); McKeon, 738 F.2d at 30-31
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The leading cases interpreting Rule 801(d)(2) as it applies
to lawyers' statements in criminal cases are the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. McKeon 174 and United States v. Salerno.175 In McKeon
and Salerno, the court detailed a test for determining the
admissibility of attorney statements in criminal cases. McKeon
established the test for evaluating the admissibility of the
defense attorney's statements as the defendant's party
admissions. Salerno applied the test to statements offered
against the government. Section i discusses this test and
concludes that, having developed initially as a test for
admitting statements against the criminal defendant, the test
is too heavily weighted against admissibility to govern the
prosecution's party admissions. Section ii reviews decisions
adopting the more permissive stance that should be applied to
governmental admissions.
i. The McKeon-Salerno Test
McKeon was the first case to address admissibility of
attorneys' statements in criminal cases under Rule 801(d)(2).
In McKeon, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered the government's argument that defense counsel's
inconsistent remarks from the opening statement in a prior
trial were admissible against the defendant in a subsequent
trial.176 Concluding that lawyers' statements would sometimes
be admissible, the court stated,
We believe that prior opening statements are not per se inadmissible
(concluding that although opening statements made by defense attorneys in
criminal trials are not per se inadmissible, caution should be used to not admit
too much); People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d. 636, 664-65 (Ill. 1994) (upholding a
lower court's decision that prevented the defense from introducing the
prosecution's strategy in an earlier related trial because of competing policy
concerns); People v. Morrison, 532 N.E.2d 1077, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(refusing to admit the prosecutor's closing arguments in a codefendant's trial).
174. 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984). Decisions prior to McKeon acknowledged
that an attorney's statement could be an authorized party admission of a
criminal defendant, but none had fully evaluated the question. See, e.g.,
United States v. Flores, 679 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1982) (treating an
attorney's letter as authorized admission under Rule 801(d)(2)); Margiotta,
662 F.2d at 142-43 (stating in dictum that attorney's statements would fall
within Rule 801(d)(2)).
175. 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317
(1992).
176. See McKeon, 738 F.3d at 28-29 (noting the government's arguments
that statements were admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(2)(B), (C), or (D)).
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in criminal cases. To hold otherwise would not only invite abuse and
sharp practice but would also weaken confidence in the justice system
itself by denying the function of trials as truth-seeking proceedings.
That function cannot be affirmed if parties are free, wholly without
explanation, to make fundamental changes in the version of facts
within their personal knowledge between trials and to conceal these
changes from the final trier of fact.177
Despite this strong language, the court defined a
restrictive test to be applied case by case to determine when
counsel's earlier opening statement would be admitted.1 7 8 The
court feared the problems that could flow from the "expansive
practices sometimes permitted" under the party admissions
rule and concluded that the use of prior statements must be
circumscribed. 79  The court identified five factors that
persuaded it to limit admissibility of defense counsel's prior
argument: consumption of time, unfairness to the party against
whom the statement is offered, deterrence of advocacy,
compromise of the defense, and disqualification of defense
counsel.18 0 Applying the test, the court in McKeon held that the
defense attorney's statements in his prior opening statement
were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).181
Many courts apply the restrictive approach elaborated in
McKeon to prosecutors' statements, 182 but they should do so
with caution. McKeon concerned the admissibility of defense
counsel's statements, so its multi-factor test is too strongly
weighted against admitting prior statements to serve as an
appropriate guide for prosecution statements. In fact, Cruz183
177. Id. at 31.
178. Id. at 31-33 (requiring the court to be convinced of three factors before
statements will be admitted).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 32-33. Considering all these factors, the McKeon court
concluded that a trial court should not admit a defense counsel's statement
unless its inconsistency with a prior statement is clear and it is the equivalent
of a testimonial statement of the defendant. See id. at 33. The court also
exhorted the trial court to determine that "the inference the prosecution seeks
to draw from the inconsistency is a fair one and that an innocent
explanation . . . does not exist." Id. The court further stated that if the
question of innocent explanation could not be resolved, the statement should
be excluded. Id.
181. See id. at 33-34 (relying on Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B)-
(C)).
182. See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 552 So. 2d 834, 839-40 (Miss. 1989)
(applying the McKeon test to the State's argument in a prior trial).
183. People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. 1994); see supra notes 7-14 and
accompanying text.
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illustrates the risk of applying McKeon to exclude prosecution
statements. 184 Although the first two factors identified in
McKeon apply with equal weight to prosecutors' prior
statements, the other three do not.
The first factor is the consideration that free use of
attorney statements in prior trials will "consume substantial
time to pursue marginal matters."185 This factor should guide
courts in evaluating the admissibility of prosecution
statements. In McKeon, the court recognized that predicting
the evidence in the opening statement is difficult and that both
evidence and tactics in a case may change from one trial to the
next. 186  The court was therefore concerned that the
explanations for the inconsistency could take too much time
and would distract the jury's attention from the main issues at
trial. 87 Like the defense, the prosecution may be surprised by
a witness's actual testimony at trial or may discover new
evidence. If the prosecution has a fair explanation for changing
its position and explaining that change, it can present it at
trial. Given the potential injustice in prosecutorial
inconsistency, however, the trial court should weigh the
defendant's argument carefully, alert for any danger signaled
by the prosecution's change of position. 8 8 The threat to the
fairness of the process justifies the necessary consumption of
time.
The second factor considered in McKeon is the risk of
inviting unfair inferences from inconsistent positions. 8 9 This
factor is closely related to the first and is likewise a legitimate
concern in determining the admissibility of government
admissions. The courts can adequately protect against
improper use of the admissions by carefully assessing the
significance of the proffered evidence and the validity of the
arguments based on it. As they do so, however, the courts
should be receptive to admitting the prosecution's prior
184. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
185. McKeon, 739 F.2d at 32.
186. See id. (commenting on possible diversionary problems with respect to
marginal issues that can erupt from one trial to the next).
187. See id. (stating that detraction from the real issues could waste the
jury's time and energy).
188. See Poulin, supra note 25, at 1460-74 (discussing possible reasons for
the change in position by the prosecution, as well as the consequences on due
process).
189. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 32 (examining the jury assessment of procedural
obligations in subsequent trials).
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statements. In McKeon, the court acknowledged that its
reasoning rested on considerations unique to the use of the
party admission rule against a criminal defendant, suggesting
that a legitimate inconsistency might arise because of the
defendant's limited burden in a criminal trial. 90 By contrast,
the government bears the burden of production. It must
therefore "present a coherent version of the facts" and should
have a comprehensive understanding of the case at the
outset. 191 Consequently, it will more often be fair to admit the
prosecution's prior statements than to admit those of defense
counsel.
The other three factors should not influence the
consideration of governmental admissions. The third factor
considered in McKeon is the fear of deterring "vigorous and
legitimate advocacy."' 192 The court's concern was that the
prospect of having statements from the first trial admitted
against the client in the later proceeding would discourage
defense counsel from making zealous and appropriate
arguments in one or the other proceeding. 93  Given the
different standards that apply to prosecution and defense
advocacy and the greater latitude accorded defense counsel,
this factor should play no role in evaluating prosecutors'
statements. Commentators and courts have noted that
prosecutors have special obligations to do justice and to
maintain the fairness of the proceeding. 194 The Supreme Court
190. See id. (emphasizing that the defense's attack on different elements in
separate trials may confuse the jury). A defendant might target one weakness
in the government's case in the first trial and another in the later trial; this
would unfairly appear to the jury as an inconsistency that undermined the




194. The rules of professional responsibility impose special obligations on
prosecutors. See generally Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor's Use of
Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous
Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 525, 528-32, 551-
56 (1999) (discussing the prosecutor's ethical duty). Prosecutors are expected
to assume special responsibility for the fairness of criminal proceedings.
Unlike their adversaries in the criminal justice process, prosecutors do not
represent clients and are therefore unfettered by the client obligations
imposed on most lawyers. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1, at 759-60 (Student ed. 1986) (suggesting that while
not representing an individual as a client, the prosecutor in a policy-making
position should regard the public as a client, while those prosecutors in more
subordinate roles should consider their office superiors as such); Roberta K.
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has frequently emphasized the importance of prosecutorial
fairness in criminal cases. 195 The difference in these advocacy
Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-
Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 931 (1996)
(discussing the constituencies represented by the prosecutor as being victims,
law enforcement agencies, and policies of the prosecutor's office); Roberta K.
Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 728-30 (1998)
[hereinafter Flowers, What You See Is What You Get] (characterizing the
prosecutor's client as the government and the public); English, supra, at 528-
42 (discussing the special obligations of the prosecutor). Prosecutors have a
special obligation of candor and are often exhorted to "do justice" or "seek
justice." Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 630-33 (1999) (asserting that prosecutors have a duty
not to impeach true testimony or argue false theories, but rather to seek
fairness and truth in order to obtain justice). Commentators have said that
the prosecutor's clearest obligation is to refrain from convicting the innocent.
See id. at 635; see also Flowers, What You See Is What You Get, supra, at 729-
30 (noting that prosecutors have the dual role of prosecuting criminals while
protecting the innocent from conviction).
195. In Berger v. United States, the Court set the bar for expectations of
prosecutorial conduct, stating,
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). InAke v. Oklahoma, the Court stated,
The State's interest in prevailing at trial-unlike that of a private
litigant-is necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and
accurate adjudication of criminal cases. Thus, also unlike a private
litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in
maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of
that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict
obtained.
470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)
(noting the prosecutor's special role "in the search for truth in criminal trials");
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 309 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the prosecutor's offer of legal advice to defendant is unfair
because "the prosecuting authorities' true adversary posture" may be
underestimated); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Fils S.A., 481 U.S.
787, 814 (1987) (demanding assurance that prosecutors who exercise
discretionary charging power "will be guided solely by their sense of public
responsibility for the attainment of justice"); United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting in
dissent the majority's failure to acknowledge "that a representative of the
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standards weakens the argument against admitting
inconsistent statements by the prosecution. Unlike deterrence
of energetic defense advocacy, deterrence of prosecutorial
exaggeration and excessive zeal serves the interest of justice.
The fourth factor in McKeon is the risk that forcing the
defense to explain the source of inconsistency may "expose
work product, trial tactics or legal theories" and thus
compromise the defendant's rights.' 96 Again, these concerns
are far less significant when evaluating the prosecution's
statements. Inquiry into explanations for apparent
inconsistency on the part of the defense threatens attorney-
client privilege. By contrast, no privilege exists in relation to
the prosecution. 197 A prosecutor's explanation may expose the
prosecution's theory and tactics, but that exposure is less
harmful to the prosecution than to the defense. 198 As a general
rule, the fairness of the proceeding warrants placing the
burden of that risk on the prosecution. If in a particular case,
the prosecution would have to expose protected material to
explain the prior statement, the court could exclude the
statement to protect the government's work product. 99
United States Government is held to a higher standard of behavior" than the
ethical rules of conduct prescribe); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424
(1976) ("A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in
deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court."); Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as
many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the
right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair
trial."); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973) (highlighting "the
ethical responsibility of the prosecutor" as a safeguard against accidental or
purposeful subversion of the trial); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256
(1967) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating, in
dissent, that prosecutors "have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make
sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to ... the
ascertainment of the true facts .....
196. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 32.
197. The prosecutor has no client whose confidential communications are
protected.
198. The prosecution is obligated to provide more pretrial discovery than
the defense. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 20.1, at 910-15 (explaining
the state's advantages in the discovery process). At trial, the prosecution
proceeds first and must present proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all
elements of the offense, whereas the defendant may elect to introduce no
evidence whatsoever. In addition, the question of attorney-client privilege
may arise if the defendant is required to explain the inconsistency, but the
privilege is not implicated by the prosecution's explanation.
199. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) (listing material not subject to
disclosure); see also United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir.
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The final policy concern raised in McKeon is the prospect
that admitting the statements will require removal of the
attorney who made the prior statements.2 00 This concern also
carries less force when evaluating a prosecutor's inconsistent
statements. 20 1 Removing a particular prosecutor is far less
troublesome than removing defense counsel. Removal of a
defendant's counsel of choice from the case raises constitutional
concerns. 20 2 Furthermore, it undermines the effectiveness of
the representation by depriving the defendant of the assistance
of the attorney familiar with the case. The new defense
attorney must attempt to establish a relationship of trust with
the defendant while getting up to speed on the case. In
contrast, a substitute prosecutor can be brought into the case
far more easily than can substitute defense counsel. Most
prosecutors' offices have a number of assistant prosecutors on
staff, and the relationship between the prosecutor and the
witnesses is not as critical as that between the defendant and
defense counsel.203 Moreover, there may be more than one
prosecutor working on the case, as well as a consistent staff of
law enforcement personnel.20 4
Having considered these five factors, the court in McKeon
defined a circumscribed test for admitting prior statements of
defense counsel.20 5 In Salerno, the court adapted the reasoning
2000) (applying the work product privilege to protect the prosecution
memorandum). But see Doubleday v. Ruh, 149 F.R.D. 601, 605-08 (E.D. Cal.
1993) (declining to provide work product protection to the prosecutor's file).
200. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33.
201. See id. (examining the consequences of the admission of opening
statements). But see State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579 N.W.2d 678, 685-86
(Wis. 1998) (discussing the negative effect on the prosecutor of admitting a
prior statement).
202. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1988) (recognizing
and reaffirming that the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
choice); United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The Sixth
Amendment entitles a federal criminal defendant to the assistance of
counsel."); see also Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel:
Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Stephen J.
Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting
Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of
Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 106-07 (1993).
But see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983) (concluding that, although
entitled to counsel, the relationship need not be "meaningful" under the Sixth
Amendment).
203. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & GREG W. STEADMAN, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1996, at 2-3 (1998).
204. See id.
205. See McKeon, 738 F.2d at 32-34 (concluding that the prior opening
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from McKeon to statements made by government lawyers and
offered by a criminal defendant. 206 The Second Circuit test
directs the trial court to make three determinations. First, it
must ask whether the prior statement involves a factual
assertion that is clearly inconsistent with the prosecution's
later assertions. 207 Second, the court must determine whether
the prosecutor's statements were the equivalent of the client's
testimonial statements. 208 Finally, the court must determine
by a preponderance of the evidence that the inconsistent
statement fairly supports the inference to be drawn and is not
subject to innocent explanation.20 9
The McKeon-Salerno test erects too many barriers to
admissibility of inconsistent prosecution statements. The
statements are generally authorized admissions, and Rule
801(d)(2)(C) should overcome the hearsay objection to a
prosecutor's prior statement.210  If the evidence presents
problems such as risk of confusion, unfair prejudice, or waste of
time, the appropriate objection falls under Rule 403.211 Under
Rule 403, the court may exclude the statement only if such
negative considerations substantially outweigh the probative
value.212 In contrast, the McKeon-Salerno test is biased against
admissibility-eschewing the Rule 403 balance in favor of
admissibility-because of the factors discussed in McKeon.
Although the special considerations that apply to statements of
defense counsel may justify that approach, the McKeon policy
considerations weigh less heavily against admitting
prosecution statements, and the usual bias in favor of
admissibility should prevail.
In some cases, of course, even the McKeon-Salerno test will
admit the evidence. In Salerno, for example, the court held the
evidence should have been admitted.213  The government
statement had been properly admitted). In analyzing the case, the court
rested its decision on Rule 801(d)(2)(B) and (C). Id. at 33-34.
206. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1991)
(expanding the application of McKeon), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317
(1992).
207. Id. at 811.
208. Id.
209. Id. (directing the district court in the evidentiary use of prior jury
arguments).
210. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
211. See id. 403.
212. Id.
213. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
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charged Auletta as a defendant and treated him as a culpable
actor.214 By contrast, in an earlier prosecution, the government
had prosecuted other defendants on the theory that Auletta
was a victim of extortion. 2t 5 At his trial, Auletta sought to
introduce portions of the prosecution's opening statement and
closing argument from the prior trial.216 He argued that these
represented party admissions and should be presented to the
jury to undermine the prosecution's claim that he was
criminally liable.217 The trial court excluded the statements,
but the court of appeals disagreed and held that the opening
and closing should have been admitted as party admissions.21 8
The court noted that the assertions offered by the defendant
were both factual and inconsistent with the government's
position at his trial.219 The court stressed the jury's need for
the information, noting that "the jury, and not the government,
must ultimately decide" the case. 220
In other instances, however, subjecting prosecutorial
statements to the special scrutiny called for by the McKeon-
Salerno test results in excluding evidence that the defendant
should be permitted to introduce. 221  In United States v.
DeLoach,222 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling excluding the
that the district court abused its discretion by not admitting evidence of
separate government theories), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
214. See id. at 811-12.
215. Id. at 810-11.
216. Id. at 810-12 (explaining that the government actions were indicative
of inconsistent positions). The defendant also tried to introduce the
indictment from the prior trial. Id. at 810-11.
217. See id. (exploring the extent of defendant's argument).
218. Id. at 811-12 (reviewing the reasoning of the lower court). The court
concluded that the indictment was a statement of the grand jury rather than
the prosecution, and therefore that it did not fall within the rule. Id. at 810-
11. The court did not specify which subsection of Rule 801(d)(2) applied to any
of the statements. See id. at 811-12.
219. See id. at 812; supra note 218.
220. Salerno, 937 F.2d at 812.
221. See, e.g., United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir.
1994) (excluding the prosecutor's closing arguments, and citing the failure to
meet the requirements of the McKeon-Salerno test); Hoover v. State, 552 So.
2d 834, 840-41 (Miss. 1989) (finding error, although harmless, on the part of
the trial court for excluding statements made by the prosecutor at the prior
trial); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1998)
(excluding the prosecutor's statements due to failure to meet McKeon's first
guideline).
222. DeLoach, 34 F.3d at 1001.
440 [Vol. 87:401
20021 PARTY ADMISSIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 441
prosecutor's statements from the earlier trial of a
codefendant. 223 The codefendant had defended by claiming
reliance on advice of counsel, DeLoach.224 At the codefendant's
trial, the prosecutor argued in closing that DeLoach had not
advised the codefendant to withhold information from the
bank.225 Of course, at DeLoach's trial the prosecution asserted
the opposite, alleging that DeLoach had advised his client not
to tell the bank.226 The court cited McKeon and Salerno and
concluded that the admissibility of prior argument "is tightly
circumscribed."227  The court upheld the trial court's ruling
because the prosecutor's statements were not statements of fact
and were not inconsistent with the government's position in its
prosecution of DeLoach. 228
The court should not have held the statements
inadmissible on that basis. The prosecutor's argument from
the codefendant's trial accurately stated the government's
position that DeLoach had not given the advice. If the
prosecution's theory in DeLoach's case relied in any way on the
assertion that he had given the advice, the court should have
viewed the statements as relevant party admissions because
they were inconsistent with the position taken by the
prosecution in DeLoach's trial. The jury should have learned of
the inconsistency, even if the prosecution could have convicted
DeLoach regardless of whether he gave the advice in question.
In People v. Morrison,2 29 the defendant argued that he
should be permitted to read to the jury excerpts of the
prosecutor's argument at the codefendant's sentencing. 230 In its
sentencing argument regarding aggravation, the prosecution
had argued that the codefendant, a female, was a major player
who had not engaged in drug transactions at the behest of any
male in the household but had done so on her own. 231 Further,
the prosecutor asserted that there was no hint that Morrison
had forced her into the trade.232 At his trial, Morrison claimed
223. Id. at 1006.




228. Id. at 1005-06.
229. 532 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).




that the codefendant owned all the drugs in the house. 233 She
testified in his defense, claiming ownership. 234 The court
nevertheless held the prosecution's prior statements
inadmissible because they did not amount to an admission that
the defendant was innocent and were not statements against
interest.235  The court applied the wrong standard. The
statements were relevant to defendant's case, suggesting that
the codefendant had greater responsibility for the drugs, and
they were made by an agent for the state who was authorized
to speak. They should have been admitted.
ii. Applying Rule 801(d)(2)(C) Without Special Scrutiny
The special scrutiny required by McKeon and Salerno is
not appropriate when a criminal defendant offers a statement
by a government agent authorized to speak for the government
against the prosecution. The special consideration for the
criminal defendant reflected in McKeon does not apply when
the defendant offers the evidence against the prosecution.236
Instead, the adoptive admission rule should be applied to
prosecutors' statements without special scrutiny.
In some cases, courts have applied less restrictive tests,
suggesting that prosecution statements will generally be
admissible. 237 This approach is more appropriate than the
233. See id. at 1087-88.
234. See id. at 1085, 1087-88.
235. See id. at 1088.
236. See supra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130-31 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding statements admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2));
United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding
that the defendant can inform the jury "that the government at one time
believed, and stated, that its proof established something different from what
it currently claims" and holding that a bill of particulars constitutes a party
admission when offered against the government); see also United States v.
Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing the admissibility of a
bill of particulars from a different trial, but concluding that the bill was not
inconsistent with the current trial). Of course, under any test, some
prosecutorial statements are properly excluded. Some statements are not
truly inconsistent; others have innocent explanations. See, e.g., United States
v. Bailey, No. 97-3130, 1998 WL 388802, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 1998) (mem.)
(upholding the exclusion of an inconsistent factual statement at a suppression
hearing because the prosecution corrected the statement in a timely fashion
and explained the mistake); United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 716 (2d Cir.
1994) (upholding the exclusion of the government's allegedly inconsistent
statements, and concluding that the positions were consistent, since the
prosecution merely expanded its theory); Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1496 (concluding
442 [Vol. 87:401
2002] PARTY ADMISSIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 443
restrictive McKeon-Salerno test. In United States v.
Bakshinian,238 the district court applied Rule 801(d)(2) to the
prosecution's statements without special scrutiny. The court
reasoned that McKeon's analysis was peculiar to statements by
defense counsel and that the government should not receive the
same leeway. 239 The court asserted that the government "may
not take inconsistent positions as to what occurred."240
Consequently, the court simply enforced the usual rule that a
party-opponent's statements-whether opinion or even
argument-are admissible. 241  Similarly, in United States v.
Kattar,242 the court held that governmental statements
submitted to the court should have been admitted as party
admissions.243 The court concluded that the jury should have
been informed that the government advanced an inconsistent
position in related litigation.244
As these decisions suggest, the test for admissibility of
prosecutors' statements should not be biased against
admissibility. The protective evaluation prescribed in McKeon
for statements offered against a criminal defendant is
inappropriate when attorney statements are offered against the
prosecution. The risk of prejudice and the constitutional
concerns that were the foundation of McKeon are simply not
implicated when the defendant seeks to introduce the
prosecution's earlier statement. In such cases, the test should
instead turn on two key questions: whether the prosecution
made an inconsistent assertion, and whether there is an
innocent explanation that is so convincing that the statement
has no evidentiary value. 245
that statements were not inconsistent); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579
N.W.2d 678, 684-86 (Wis. 1998) (declining to admit statements made by the
prosecutor during defendant's initial bail hearing because the statements were
not clearly inconsistent with the government position at trial).
238. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
239. See id. at 1107-08.
240. Id. at 1108.
241. See id. at 1109. The court did not apply McKeon's requirement that
the statement be one of fact, and the court did not specify which subsection of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) applied. See id.
242. 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988).
243. The court did not rely on Rule 801(d)(2)(C), but instead based its
decision on Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Id. at 131.
244. See id.
245. See United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1994)
(describing the conditions necessary to permit defense introduction of a
prosecutor's prior statements as evidence).
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b. Documents Filed with the Court
When the government files a formal document with the
court, it should be regarded as containing authorized
admissions.246 As the court noted in Kattar, the government
should not be permitted to indicate to one federal court that
certain statements are trustworthy and accurate, and then
argue to another that they are hearsay. 247 The official filing
reflects authorization and the statements it contains should
accordingly be admissible against the government in that case
or a later case.
Some pleadings should also be held to be authorized
admissions within Rule 801(d)(2)(C). 248 In criminal cases, an
indictment will not be viewed as the prosecution's statement,
since it is issued by the grand jury.249 Otherwise, the rule
should apply broadly to the government's pleadings. An
information, for example, is the charge of the prosecutor and, if
inconsistent with later prosecution positions, should be treated
as a party admission. Likewise, bills of particulars are the
statements of the authorized spokesperson for the government
and should fall within the rule. 250
246. Since a lawyer designated by the government will generally be
responsible for the filing, these may be viewed as a subcategory of attorneys'
statements.
247. See Kattar, 840 F.2d at 131.
248. In civil cases, if a party amends its pleadings, the prior pleadings may
be admitted as party admissions. See United States v. GAF, Corp., 928 F.2d
1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that not allowing the jury knowledge of
the original complaint is "substantial abuse of discretion"); Andrews v. Metro
N. Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1929)
(stating that the original pleading "remains as a statement once seriously
made by an authorized agent, and as such it is competent evidence of the facts
stated"); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 80, § 8.31, at 1120-22
(explaining the admission of prior pleadings and their caveats); Roman, supra
note 45, at 996 & n.96 (examining cases involving amended or superceded
pleadings as evidentiary admissions).
249. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
indictment inadmissible), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); see also
GAF, 928 F.2d at 1261 (citing Judge Learned Hand's position in Falter v.
United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir. 1928), that indictments do not
constitute pleadings).
250. See GAF, 928 F.2d at 1260 (stating that the fairness and integrity of
the truth-seeking process dictate that a bill of particulars be considered an
admission); cf United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496 (8th Cir. 1994)
(considering the admissibility of a bill of particulars from a different case but
concluding it was not inconsistent without discussing the applicability of Rule
801(d)(2)).
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Statements in other types of documents filed with the court
should likewise be admissible as authorized admissions.251 In
United States v. Kattar,252 for example, the defendant argued
that the government's descriptions of the Church of Scientology
made in other cases should be admitted as party admissions.253
The descriptions were contained in a sentencing memorandum
submitted by the government in a different criminal case and
in a brief filed in a civil case.254 The statements in those
documents were at odds with the testimony of government
witnesses and inconsistent with the prosecution's
characterization of the Church in the present case.255
Interestingly, the defendant did not argue that the statements
were authorized admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(C), even
though statements by government lawyers appear to qualify as
statements by agents authorized to speak on the subject.256
The court held that, by submitting the statements to the courts
for the truth of their contents, the Justice Department
manifested its belief in those statements. 257  They were
therefore held to be admissible as adoptive admissions under
Rule 801(d)(2)(B). 258 A better approach would have been to
characterize the memo and brief as authorized statements for
the government and admit them as authorized vicarious
admissions.25 9
c. Official Publications
An official publication issued by a governmental authority
should also be treated as an authorized admission and be
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C). 260 By definition, such
251. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, No. 97-3130, 1998 WL 388802, at *1
(D.C. Cir. May 7, 1998) (mem.) (agreeing that the government's statement in
response to a motion to suppress may be a party admission).
252. 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988).
253. See id. at 126.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. The defendant argued that the statements should have been admitted
under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) or (D). See id. at 130.
257. See id. at 131.
258. See id.
259. See Freeland v. United States, 631 A.2d 1186, 1193-94 (D.C. 1993)
(holding that a statement by the prosecutor in a memorandum in support of a
motion to admit evidence acted as a party admission).
260. Reliance on this rule may be unnecessary since the evidence may be
admissible over a hearsay objection under Rule 803(8). See supra note 92.
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publications are the authorized statements of the government
subdivisions that issue them. When those publications contain
statements that are useful to the defense, they should be
admitted under the authorized admissions rule, Rule
801(d)(2)(C). 261
In United States v. Van Griffin,262 the court of appeals held
that the trial court had improperly excluded a government
manual offered by the defendant. 263  The defendant was
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in a federal
recreation area.264  The Park Ranger who arrested the
defendant testified that he had administered several sobriety
tests to the defendant, including a test which assessed the
jerkiness of the defendant's eyes. 265  On cross-examination,
defense counsel questioned the Ranger about his
administration of this test.266  The defense then asked to
introduce the government manual setting out the proper
method for administering the test.267 The court of appeals held
that the manual should have been admitted.268 The court
concluded that "[uin this case the government department
charged with the development of rules for highway safety was
the relevant and competent section of the government" and
that its pamphlet was therefore admissible as a party
admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), the rule governing non-
authorized vicarious admissions. 269
The publication might better have been evaluated as an
authorized admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(C). Rather than the
statement of an employee concerning matters within the scope
of the employee's duties, the publication was more likely a
compilation of information from more than one source and
likely included statements of government employees whose
duties related to researching and writing and not to
261. Similar items have been admitted in civil cases. See, e.g., Geuss v.
Pfizer, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 164, 172 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that official
job descriptions are admissible under Rule 801(d), although not specifying
which subsection governs).
262. 874 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1989).
263. See id. at 638.
264. See id. at 635-36.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 636.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 638.
269. Id. The court was careful to state that not every government
publication would necessarily fall under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). See id.
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administering the sobriety test. Disseminating the work as an
official publication of the government, however, appears to
qualify it as the statement(s) of agent(s) authorized to speak for
the government on the topic. Government publications relating
to other types of scientific testing may prove similarly useful to
defendants in other criminal cases.270
In federal cases, defendants should be able to introduce
relevant portions of the United States Attorney's Manual
(Manual). Although the Manual contains a disclaimer,
providing that it is not a source of rights, it is an authorized
publication of the Department of Justice. 27' Indeed, the
Manual purports to collect departmental policies on most
critical questions and to be the controlling authority in most
instances.272 Allowing evidentiary use of the Manual is not
precluded by the disclaimer. By admitting excerpts from the
Manual as authorized admissions, the defendant does not claim
rights but merely uses the Manual as evidence of a relevant
governmental position. For example, the defendant may wish
to inform the jury of the Department of Justice policy on plea
agreements in a particular kind of case to demonstrate the
benefit obtained by a cooperating witness.273 The rule should
be applied to permit the defendant to do so.
d. Internal and External Reports
The government generates a large number of reports.27 4
270. See, e.g., RICHARD H. Fox & CARL L. CUNNINGHAM, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME SCENE SEARCH AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 41-43
(1973) (describing how to photograph deceased persons so as to increase the
evidentiary value of the photograph); BARBARA A. MANILI ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, POLICE DRUG TESTING 9-11 (1987) (providing instruction on the
methods of conducting drug tests, including screening tests and confirmation
tests); U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SERVICES (Colleen
Wade et al. eds., rev. ed. 1999) (U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of
Investigation Laboratory Division CD-ROM) (providing instructions on
gathering forensic evidence).
271. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 1-
1.100 (David M. Nissman et. al. eds., 1997).
272. See id. § 1-1.200 (stating that the Manual, which "is intended to be a
comprehensive collection of policies" is controlling where it "conflicts with
earlier Department statements, except for Attorney General's statements").
273. See, e.g., id. §§ 6-4.310, 6-4.320 (outlining policies related to plea
agreements in tax cases and stating the Department of Justice's policy that
government attorneys oppose nolo contendere pleas).
274. See JOE MOREHEAD, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION SOURCES 115 (5th ed. 1996) (providing examples of numerous
types of government reports).
447
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Some are internal reports, prepared by government employees
assigned to prepare the reports. 275  Others, however, are
external reports, prepared by individuals or groups outside the
government asked to investigate a particular issue and report
back.276  While internal reports will normally qualify as
authorized admissions, external reports should rarely be
admissible under the party admission rule.277
Internal reports are normally prepared by employees
acting with authority to report. In other settings, courts have
held that statements that are authorized to be made internally
may be admitted as authorized party admissions.278 Courts
should use this reasoning to admit internal government reports
as authorized admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(C). 2 79
External reports, on the other hand, should not normally
be admissible against the government as authorized
admissions. The government regularly commissions special
reports on matters requiring governmental action from special
boards with members from outside government. 280  The
assigned task is typically to gather information and prepare a
275. Id. at 123 (explaining that the Clerk of the House is required to
publish certain documents annually for the House of Representatives).
276. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FIN.
POSTSECONDARY EDUC., MAKING COLLEGE AFFORDABLE AGAIN: FINAL
REPORT ii (1993) (noting that the Commision, created to study college
financing, is submitting its final report to Congress); NAT'L EDUC. COMM'N ON
TIME AND LEARNING, PRISONERS OF TIME: RESEARCH 3 (1994) (introducing
research the Commission prepared for Congress).
277. See infra notes 280-88 and accompanying text.
278. See Theriot v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 742 F.2d 877, 882 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that a statement made in an internal Personal Injury Report
was admissible); Kingsley v. Baker/Beech-Nut Corp., 546 F.2d 1136, 1140-41
(5th Cir. 1977) (construing the rule to encompass internal statements within
the definition of party admissions); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 11.90, 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that the Advisory
Committee expressed an intention to settle the split in precedent and provide
that an authorized statement that remained within the organization and was
never communicated to a third party could nevertheless be admitted under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C)), affd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
279. This application of the party admission rule is likely to be
insignificant because most internal reports will fall within the hearsay
exception for public records. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 154 (1988) (applying FED. R. EVID. 803(8) and holding
that a report of a naval investigation of an accident was admissible as a public
record).
280. See MOREHEAD, supra note 274, at 114 (discussing House and Senate
reports preparted by independent committees).
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report for the responsible government department.281  The
reports are intended to inform official governmental action, but
the reports themselves should not be characterized as official
publications. If official action is taken on the basis of a report,
then its admissibility as an adoptive admission is clear.282 If,
however, action has not been taken, the party offering the
report might argue that it is an authorized statement
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C).
That argument should generally fail. The courts should
draw a line between outsiders asked to give an impartial
evaluation of an issue and agents who speak with authority for
the government. In civil cases, courts have rejected the
argument that a party's expert witness is necessarily a speaker
authorized to speak for the party and therefore able to make
authorized vicarious admissions for the party; the expert's
statement will be a vicarious admission only if clearly
authorized by the party.283 In the government context, courts
should distinguish between independent investigative bodies
and agents. In United States v. Durrani,284 for example, the
court rejected the defendant's effort to introduce portions of a
report of the President's Special Review Board.285 The Board
was appointed by the President to conduct a comprehensive
study of the National Security Council, which entailed
investigation of the Iran-Contra operation.286 The defendant
offered excerpts of the report to support his claim that he had
281. Id.
282. See supra Part III.A.1.
283. See 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 801.22, at 163 n.1 (discussing cases).
284. 659 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Conn. 1987).
285. See id. at 1185 (citing United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d
Cir. 1967), the court rejected the defendant's argument that the report fell
within Rule 801(d)(2)). A report such as this does not fall within Rule
801(d)(2)(D) because the Board, while arguably acting as an agent of the
Executive Branch, did not speak about matters related to its duties. Although
one could conceive of situations where the Executive Branch does adopt the
report, rendering it admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), in this case, the
defendant offered no evidence that the Executive Branch had acted on the
basis of the report or had adopted the report in any other way. See Wright-
Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a City Manager's action on the report of the personnel
department acted as adoption); Pilgrim v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 118 F.3d 864, 870
(1st Cir. 1997) (finding the report of the Grievance Committee to have been
adopted by action taken on it by the President of the College). In Durrani, the
court also rejected the defendant's attempt to admit the report as a public
record under Rule 803(8). 659 F. Supp. at 1186.
286. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. at 1184.
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been acting for the government in selling missile parts.2 87 The
court should have considered whether the report was an
authorized statement that fell within Rule 801(d)(2)(C). The
applicability of the subsection would then have turned on
whether the Board acted as an agent of the Executive Branch
or as an outside body asked to explore the problem. 288
Even if the Board in Durrani was the President's agent,
however, not all portions of the report would be admissible.
The report explained that the "Board was not established.., as
an investigative body nor was it to determine matters of
criminal culpability [but] was established to gather the facts, to
place them in their proper historical context, and to make
recommendations about what corrective steps might be
taken. '289 The portions of the report that merely relayed
information that the Board had gathered do not fall neatly
within the party admissions rule; they contain the hearsay
statements of persons without government authority, and those
statements are subject to independent hearsay analysis. 290 The
recommendations and any fact findings, however, fell within
the Board's authority to speak, because it was charged to report
back to the President.291 Of course, the President was free to
reject their conclusions, but the report was intended to become
part of the Executive Branch's position on the question and the
President had not disavowed it.292
In sum, although a line should be drawn limiting the rule's
application to external reports, many statements and
documents emanating from the government should qualify as
authorized admissions. Since the government can speak only
through its agents, numerous employees speak with authority
287. Id. at 1184.
288. See, e.g., Osterneck v. E. T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 327 (N.D.
Ga. 1984). In Osterneck, the court considered the admissibility of a report by a
board that was appointed by the corporation pursuant to consent decree. Id.
at 331-34. Under the terms of the decree, the membership of the board had to
be approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 330. Such a
group should not be viewed as the agent of the corporation, and its statements
should not fall within Rule 801(d)(2).
289. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. at 1186 (emphasis omitted) (quoting from the
report).
290. See Osterneck, 106 F.R.D. at 333 (holding inadmissible a report that
relayed information from third parties and did not purport to digest or
evaluate it); see also infra notes 440-44 and accompanying text.
291. Exec. Order No. 12,575, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,718 (Dec. 1, 1988).
292. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. at 1187 (noting that the President established
the Board to study the facts as they related to national security policies).
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for the government. Their statements may be oral statements
on behalf of the government or may take the form of official
publications or other writings. Courts should recognize that
these authorized statements are the government's vicarious
admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(C).
C. RULE 801(d)(2)(D): NON-AUTHORIZED VICARIOUS
ADMISSIONS
. The subsection of the rule that courts are most reluctant to
apply against the government is subsection (D), which defines
non-authorized statements by agents as non-hearsay. 93 This
provision departed from the common law, eliminating the
requirement that the principal authorize the statement and
admitting statements solely because the agent spoke
concerning an appropriate subject matter. 294 Rule 801(d)(2)
unquestionably separates the law of party admissions from the
law of vicarious liability and treats agents' statements as
admissions of the principal even when the agent was
authorized neither to speak nor to bind the principal. 295 The
Advisory Committee supported this change in its discussion of
Rule 801(d)(2)(D):
The tradition has been to test the admissibility of statements by
agents, as admissions, by applying the usual test of agency. Was the
admission made by the agent acting in the scope of his employment?
Since few principals employ agents for the purpose of making
damaging statements, the usual result was exclusion of the
293. See United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(emphasizing the distinction between adopted statements admissible under
Rule 801(d)(2)(B) and the statements of an agent relating to matters within
the scope of the agency); United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644, 650 (6th
Cir. 1975) (holding that it was not error to exclude evidence that an agent of
the Internal Revenue Service believed that the defendant was guilty of
nothing more than a civil offense); United States v. Powers, 467 F.2d 1089,
1095 (7th Cir. 1972) (approving the exclusion of an IRS agent's opinions about
whether the proceeds from certain checks were taxable income); United States
v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating that agents of the
government are supposedly disinterested in the outcome of a trial and are
traditionally unable to bind the sovereign); People v. McDaniel, 647 N.E.2d
266, 272 (Ill. 1995) (holding that out-of-court statements by agents of the State
in a criminal prosecution were properly excluded); State v. Therriault, 485
A.2d 986, 992 (Me. 1984) (holding that a crime lab report was properly
excluded at the request of the defendant as there was no clear exception found
under Maine Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)); State v. Asbridge, 555 N.W.2d 571,
575-76 (N.D. 1996) (taking a narrow view of the agent's admissions).
294. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee's note (discussing
the inapplicability of traditional agency tests).
295. See id.
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statement. Dissatisfaction with this loss of valuable and helpful
evidence has been increasing. A substantial trend favors admitting
statements related to a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment.
96
To introduce non-authorized statements of agents against
the government under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a defendant should
merely be required to demonstrate that the speaker was an
agent of the government at the time the statement was made
and that the statement related to matters within the scope of
the agent's duties. If the statement satisfies these criteria, it
should be admissible against the prosecution under the rule.
Courts must first determine who is an agent of the
government in the context of a criminal prosecution. Courts
applying the vicarious admissions rules in civil cases
sometimes wrestle with questions of agency but conclude that
the term is used in its ordinary legal sense in the rule and is
not subject to narrow construction. 297 Concepts of agency law
are sometimes elusive within the framework of criminal law. 298
296. See id. The Advisory Committee cited Grayson v. Williams, in which
the court held that the statements of an agent relating to matters within the
scope of his duties should be admissible against the principal and cited
Wigmore's condemnation of the more limited rule as "absurd." 256 F.2d 61, 66
(10th Cir. 1958); see also Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094
(1st Cir. 1995) (noting that a statement need only concern matters within the
scope of agency and need not be directed by the employer).
297. See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Hacros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 557
n.9 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that because the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not define the term "agent," the court "must assume that Congress intended to
refer to general common law principles of agency when it used the term");
Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that when
factors proving the existence of an agency relationship are present, testimony
should not be excluded simply because it is offered against a corporate
employee rather than the company itself); United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d
730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that it would be "a hyper-technical
construction of the rule" to conclude that it does not apply when there is a
sufficient supervisory relationship between two individuals even though there
is no actual agency relationship between the two); Crawford v. Garnier, 719
F.2d 1317, 1324 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that an individual was the
defendant's agent through his job of handling and processing applications);
Nekolny v. Painter 653 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a
witness was the township supervisor's agent and that his statements
concerned a matter within the scope of his agency or employment so as to be
excluded from hearsay); DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 426, at 325 (1980) ("the interpretation of the Rule
should not be hobbled by the definitions of [agent and servant] which would
apply under the substantive law"). But see Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032,
1038 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying the common law definitions of "agent" and
"servant" to Rule 801(d)(2)(D)).
298. A Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation once told the
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Section 1 discusses the agency relationship, arguing that not
only government employees, but also some non-employees, may
be agents whose non-authorized statements may be admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Section 2 considers the question of
what statements relate to the government agent's duties and
consequently fall within the rule.299
1. The Agency Relationship
a. Employee Agents
A straightforward application of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) leads to
the conclusion that a government employee's statement about
matters within the scope of the employee's duties should be
admitted when offered by a criminal defendant. In Rodela v.
State,300 the Texas court applied the rule to reach this result.
The defendant wanted to call a witness who would testify that
he and a police sergeant had a conversation over drinks in a
bar in which the officer indicated he had used force to extract
the defendant's confession. 30 1 The court treated the question of
admissibility as routine under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence
801(e)(2)(D), which defines as a party admission an agent's
author that, when he testified, he was frequently asked on cross-examination,
"What makes you so special, Agent?" Perhaps the question would have the
desired effect on the jury, but it reflects a misunderstanding of the term
"special agent." The FBI agent was titled Special Agent to differentiate him
from a general agent, who would have the authority to enter binding
commitments for the United States Government. The Special Agent, by
contrast, represents the United States for only limited purposes. Under Rule
801(d)(2)(D), the Special Agent as well as a broad range of other government
agents are declarants whose statements concerning their work may be the
government's party admissions.
299. Of course, to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), the agent must
have made the statement while the agency existed. See, e.g., Escalante v.
Municipality of Cayey, 967 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D.P.R. 1997) (noting that a police
officer's statements made when the officer was no longer employed are
hearsay); see also Burns v. Republic Sav. Bank, 25 F. Supp. 2d 809, 820 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) (declaring that statements were not admissible because the
declarant had left the defendant's board before making them). If the employee
has been fired, the rule does not apply. Similarly, if the non-employee agent is
no longer acting for the government, the rule does not apply. See United
States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976) (side-stepping the question
of whether an informant's statement could fall within Rule 801(d)(2), and
holding instead that the statements were made after agency had terminated).
300. 829 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. App. 1992); see also Sadrud-Din v. City of
Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (recognizing in a civil rights action
that police officers were agents of the city).
301. Rodela, 829 S.W.2d at 848.
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statement concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency.302 The court merely noted that the sergeant was an
employee of the police department and spoke concerning
actions taken in his official capacity.30 3
A number of courts, however, have not treated the question
as routine and have refused to admit under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
statements by government employees that were unquestionably
related to the scope of their duties. 30 4 In State v. Therriault,30 5
for example, the court rejected the defendant's argument that
an exculpatory report from the state police crime lab should be
admissible under Maine Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), which is
identical to the federal rule.30 6 The report was prepared by a
state trooper whose job was to conduct laboratory analyses for
the state.307 The report contained his statements based on his
evaluation of two rape kits and other evidence relevant to the
302. Id. at 849.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., State v. Jurgensen, 681 A.2d 981, 985-86 (Conn. App. Ct.
1996) (concluding that the testimony of an informant would be admissible
even if the court had chosen to view the police and its agents as opposing
parties because the informant had only introduced the defendant to an
undercover officer, and even if the informant were an agent of the police, his
phone calls would have fallen outside the scope of any possible agency
relationship); People v. McDaniel, 647 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (Ill. 1995)
(concluding that the statements of an assistant state's attorney were not
admissible as admissions of party opponent); State v. Asbridge, 555 N.W.2d
571, 575-76 (N.D. 1996) (concluding that the deposition of a state toxicologist
in a different case was not admissible against the State as a party admission);
State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1998) (holding that
"a court should not admit into evidence in a criminal proceeding a prior
statement made by a prosecutor unless the court concludes that the three
guidelines established in McKeon, and applied in Salerno, Orena, and
DeLoach, are satisfied"); State v. Smith, 153 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Wis. 1967)
(concluding that a statement made at a burglary scene by a municipal police
officer was not admissible against the State absent evidence of the officer's
authority to speak for the State).
305. 485 A.2d 986 (Me. 1984).
306. Id. at 992. The court held that the trial court should have admitted
the report under Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6), the business records
exception. Id. at 994. That rule requires personal knowledge and business
routine, and permits the court to exclude the evidence if circumstances
suggest a lack of trustworthiness. Id. Three justices dissented from this
holding. Id. at 998 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 991. The report concluded that no semen or foreign hairs were
found and that the victim's clothes had no rips or tears. Id. The court also
considered whether the report would be admissible under Maine Rule of
Evidence 803(6), the business records exception, and concluded that the
defendant could rely on that exception but would have to lay a sufficient
foundation. Id. at 993-95.
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crime with which the defendant was charged. 30 8 Had the
trooper been an employee of a private sector corporation, and
had the report been offered against the corporation in civil
litigation, there would be little question as to the admissibility
of the report. The same result should attend the offer of the
report of a government employee against the prosecution in a
criminal case.
Similarly, in United States v. Warren,30 9 the court rejected
the defendant's argument that statements in an officer's arrest
reports should have been admitted over a hearsay objection.310
The officer stated in the reports that two suspects other than
the defendant carried pistols and sold drugs from the arrest
location. 311 The court evaluated the statements solely under
the rules governing business records and public records 312 and
held that the trial court had not committed plain error by
excluding them.31 3  It never discussed the possibility of
admitting them under the rule governing non-authorized
vicarious admissions. 314  In fact, the court should have
admitted the statements under that rule. The lieutenant made
the arrest reports while he was an agent of the government,
and the reports related to matters within the scope of his
employment, specifically the investigation of the criminal
violations in question. 315 Accordingly, the statements were
admissible non-authorized vicarious admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(D), and they should have been admitted.
Warren illustrates the risk of unfairness when courts
narrowly apply the rule to governmental statements. To obtain
convictions of the defendant on drug trafficking and firearm
charges, the prosecution's key pieces of evidence were drugs
and a single handgun found in the apartment where the
308. Id. at 991.
309. 42 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
310. Id. at 655.
311. Id. at 656.
312. Id. at 656-67.
313. Id.
314. See id. The court concluded that, under Rule 803(6), the officer's
apparent lack of personal knowledge was fatal to the defendant's argument,
and that the defendant had a credible argument under Rule 803(8)(C), which
has a more relaxed personal knowledge requirement, but had not raised it at
trial. See id. at 656-57. The court held that statements attached to a criminal
complaint submitted to the court are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Id.
at 655.
315. See id. at 656-57.
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defendant was arrested. 316 One of the law enforcement officers
responsible for the investigation identified two other people
associated with that location as selling drugs and possessing a
pistol.317 The jury should have been permitted to learn of his
statements. The evidence might have triggered reasonable
doubt concerning the prosecution's theory that the drugs and
gun belonged to the defendant. If the prosecution believed that
the officer was mistaken or had made the statement without
adequate investigation, it was fully empowered to present that
position to the jury.
b. Non-Employee Agents
In applying the rule governing non-authorized statements
of agents, it is important to realize that one can be an agent
without being an employee of the principal. Some agency
relationships are far more limited in time and purpose than an
employment relationship. In criminal cases, the paradigm of
the non-employee agent is the confidential informant who
works with law enforcement agents in developing a case
against a target. Defendants have argued that informants'
statements should be admitted as governmental party
admissions. 318  Although some courts have accepted this
characterization, 319 others are reluctant to accept the argument
that informants are agents. 320 Close examination of the role
316. See id. at 650.
317. Id. at 655.
318. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that an unavailable informant's alleged statement to a witness that
he had set the defendant up was inadmissible as hearsay); United States v.
Finley, 708 F. Supp. 906, 910 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (concluding that even though the
witness was a government informant, his statement was not admissible as a
party admission).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 987-89 (6th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that although the defendant had a meritorious theory-that taped
statements should be admitted against the government because the
informants acted as government agents in procuring them-defendant had not
raised this theory at trial, and the district court's exclusion of the statements
was not clearly erroneous); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 851 (6th
Cir. 1998) (concluding that conversations between the informant and
defendant were in furtherance of a goal "to establish a trusting relationship"
and therefore were within the scope of the agency relationship).
320. See, e.g., Finley, 708 F. Supp. at 910-11 (rejecting defendants'
argument that an informant's statements fell within Rule 801(d)(2)); State v.
Thompson, 622 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the argument
that an informant was an employee of the police, and holding that Rule
801(d)(2) did not apply); cf. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1498-99 (3d Cir.
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played by some informants, however, leads to the conclusion
that at least some of their out of court statements fall within
Rule 801(d)(2)(D). 321
Law enforcement has various types of arrangements with
informants. Some informants merely come forward with
information that helps develop a case or focus an
investigation. 322 Other informants work for law enforcement
agents by arranging meetings with targets, encouraging targets
to enter into transactions with undercover government agents,
or engaging in transactions with targets under government
supervision and surveillance. 323 Some informants cooperate in
a single case or for a short period of time; others work with the
government over a period of years.324 The law enforcement
1993) (holding that the informant's statements were improperly admitted
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in a civil suit against the defendant, an undercover
agent in the state Bureau of Narcotics, because the informant was not shown
to be an agent of the defendant himself). But see Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1505
(Becker, J., concurring) (suggesting that the informant was at least under the
supervision of officials at the Bureau).
321. In some cases, the government may adopt an informant's statement,
making it admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). See supra Part III.A. The
statements informants make will rarely be authorized and therefore
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(C). The informant's authorized conversations
will be the false statements made to win the target's confidence.
322. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors:
Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917,
929-30 (1999).
323. The incentives for these arrangements vary. Some informants are
drawn to the work primarily by the payment they receive, others to receive
leniency when facing criminal charges. See, e.g., Roy v. United States, 38 Fed.
Cl. 184, 185-86 (1997) (describing an informant's agreement to cooperate with
the FBI as the result of a plea agreement and payment).
324. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 297, 300-06 (1994)
(describing a relationship of long duration between informants and federal
authorities); see also Khairallah v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 57, 58-59 (1999)
(rejecting a claim for payment brought by an informant who worked with the
government for a substantial period of time); Shelley Murphy & Ralph Ranalli,
U.S. Tightens Rules on Informants, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2001, at Al,
available at 2001 WL 3914202 (discussing the problems associated with
retaining several FBI informants over a period of twenty to thirty years); Bill
Varian, Informers Arrest Raises Questions in Citrus, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 15, 2000, at 3, available at 2000 WL 5613840 (discussing the Sheriffs
Department's use of an informant to build cases against at least twenty-six
people, and how the informant was one of at least 300 used by the Sheriffs
Department since the early 1980s); Michael D. Sorkin, Lying by Informer
Causes U.S. to Drop Drug Charges Against Four in Miami, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 3512544 (discussing the
case of a DEA informant who was paid more than $2.2 million over a sixteen
year period to help in over 400 arrests).
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agency working with an informant may pay the informant for
specific results, such as arrests, or may essentially maintain
the informant on a stipend while the informant is helping to
develop a particular case. 325
While working with law enforcement, an informant is not a
full-time employee or agent of the government, but the
informant is an agent for some purposes. For example, if the
informant badgers the defendant into committing a crime to
which the defendant was not predisposed, the defendant should
be acquitted by reason of entrapment.326 If the informant
pressures the defendant to confess, the confession will be
treated as involuntary.327 In both instances, the conduct of the
informant is attributed to the government. The law of party
admissions should follow the substantive criminal law in this
regard. Thus, if the informant makes a statement concerning a
case while working with the government on that case, it should
be admissible against the government as a non-authorized
vicarious admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
Consider, for instance, how the rule might operate in a
case where the defendant raises an entrapment defense. The
informant's statements to the defendant creating the pressure
to commit the crime would be admissible as non-hearsay
because they are relevant for their effect on the hearer (the
325. See, e.g., United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1060 n.1 (5th Cir.
1985) (explaining that the DEA paid informants expense money and a
contingent fee to be paid upon a successful arrest).
326. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1958)
(recognizing that the informant is an agent of the government for entrapment
purposes); see also United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1995)
(noting that an informant's actions, as recounted by the defendants, were
sufficient to establish government inducement, a necessary element for
entrapment); United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that pressure exerted on a defendant by an informant could establish the
government inducement element of the entrapment defense); United States v.
Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. Gomez-
Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1975), to acknowledge that an informant's
actions are chargeable to the government in entrapment cases); United States
v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that an informant's action
in supplying narcotics for sale constituted entrapment, and noting that an
agent and an informant "must be treated as acting in concert").
327. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (finding a
confession involuntary where it was the result of a paid informant exerting
pressure on the defendant in prison); see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
176-77 (1985) (holding that an informant's conversation with an indicted
defendant violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
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defendant) rather than for the truth of the assertions.328 The
hearsay problem arises if the informant makes a statement
after the encounter with the defendant, describing what
transpired. For example, the informant may tell someone, "I
really leaned on the defendant to get her to do this deal." That
statement should be admissible to prove the truth of the
assertion-that the informant pressured the defendant. If the
informant is available, the government can attempt to correct
any factual errors by calling the informant as a witness. If the
informant is unavailable, the government is still fairly
accountable for the informant's representations concerning the
events in which he was involved. 329
In civil cases, courts have recognized such non-employee
agency relationships as a basis for admitting statements under
the party admission rule. In EEOC v. Watergate,330 for
example, the defendant argued against applying the rule to
admit the statements of residents who served as volunteers on
the condominium association's governance boards. 331  The
defendant pointed out that the residents were neither officials
of, nor employed by, the Watergate and played a limited role in
its governance. 332  The court, however, focused on the
particular business of the defendant that precipitated the
328. See, e.g., United States v. Cantu, 876 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1989)
(noting that a statement is not hearsay if its significance "lies solely in the fact
that it was made").
329. Interestingly, in State v. Dreher, 695 A.2d 672 (N.J. Super. 1997),
abrogated by State v. Brown, 784 A.2d 1244 (N.J. 2001), the court noted, in
support of its holding, that the agent who swore to the accuracy of the
statements as affiant was testifying at the time of the offer and could therefore
correct or explain any inaccuracy. See id. at 721. Under Rule 801(d)(2) the
presence or absence of the declarant should have no impact on the
admissibility of the statement. Moreover, limiting the use of Rule 801(d)(2)
against the government to those cases in which the declarant testifies accords
the prosecution too much control over the jury's access to information that
calls the prosecution's case into question. If the defendant can introduce the
statement only when the declarant testifies, the prosecution may be able to
bury the evidence by declining to call the declarant as a witness. Cf. United
States v. Finley, 708 F. Supp. 906, 910 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (considering the
defendant's arguments based on the government's represented intention not to
call its informant). In addition, the defendant may have substantial reasons
for not calling a witness identified with the government. See Freeland v.
United States, 631 A.2d 1186, 1194 n.11 (D.C. 1993) (declining to elaborate on
the reasons why the defense would not want to call the prosecutor as its own
witness).
330. 24 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 1994).
331. Id. at 637-38.
332. Id. at 639.
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litigation. 333 The sixty-three-year-old complainant claimed age
discrimination. She alleged that the Watergate had dismissed
her as manager and tennis professional of the Racquet Club
and not hired for a newly created manager position that took
over all her duties.334  To support her case, she offered
statements by two residents speaking of the complainant's age
as a negative factor.335 The court held that the statements fell
within Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as non-authorized vicarious
admissions because both residents served on the volunteer
committee that was charged with addressing the problem and
crafted the reorganization that eliminated the complainant's
job. 336 One of them was also on the committee that made the
hiring recommendation to the Board.337
The government could argue that a confidential informant
is comparable to an independent contractor whose statements
are not admissible. 338  In some instances, confidential
informants may be independent contractors, gathering
information independently and then approaching law
enforcement authorities hoping to be rewarded. Frequently,
however, the informant works more closely with the
government.339  If the informant is carrying out specific
assignments for law enforcement agents, pursuant to an
agreement for some kind of prosecutorial leniency or an
understanding that the informant will be paid, then the
informant's statements should fall within the rule. Civil cases
have established that one does not become an agent merely by
being engaged as an expert to perform an evaluation or to
testify. 340 Some greater degree of direction and supervision is
essential to establish the agency relationship. 34' When an
informant works at the direction or under the supervision of
333. See id. at 640.
334. Id. at 637.
335. Id. at 638.
336. See id. at 640.
337. See id. at 639.
338. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 40, § 801.33[21[b], at 801-67
n.12.
339. See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Sanford v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 923 F.2d 1142, 1149-
50 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a physician is not an agent of his patient);
Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that statements were made by independent contractors, not agents).
341. See Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1504-05 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker,
J., concurring).
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law enforcement, that relationship exists because the
informant does not exercise significant independent judgment
and is closely identified with the law enforcement mission.
Therefore, the informant's statements should be admissible.
c. Crime Victims and Other Witnesses
By contrast, the statements of the crime victim and other
witnesses are not admissible as government party
admissions. 342 In some cases, the defendant has argued that
such statements are admissible as the government's vicarious
admissions. For example, in Halstead v. State,343 the defendant
wanted to introduce a letter written by an alleged victim of
sexual abuse expressing her affection for the defendant and her
desire to remain in his custody if her mother died.344 The
defendant had confronted and impeached the victim with the
letter on cross-examination, but the defendant still wanted to
introduce the letter itself and invite the jury to credit the truth
of the assertions.345 The court properly held that the letter did
not qualify as a party admission. 346 The State brings the
prosecution on behalf of the executive, or the people-not as the
representative of the victim. 347 The victim does not embody the
State in the litigation, but merely occupies the role of an
especially important witness. Furthermore, the government
does not adopt the witness's statements merely by calling the
witness to testify.34 8
342. The statements may be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) if the
government adopts the statement by, for example, including the statement
and relying on it in a submission to the court. See supra notes 104-41 and
accompanying text.
343. 891 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. App. 1994).
344. Id. at 12.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 12 n.1. The court overruled Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933
(Tex. App. 1992), in which the court stated, without discussion, that the
victim's statements "were admissions by a party opponent." Id. at 935.
347. See State v. Brady, 59 A. 6, 7 (N.J. 1904) (rejecting the argument that
a victim's prior statement was admissible; the court held that "[tihe state, not
the girl, was the party, and no admission made by her could bind the state").
348. Courts have rejected the analogous argument that the statements of a
party's expert witness are party admissions except when the witness was
specifically authorized to make the statement for the party. See, e.g., Kirk v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
proposition that an expert, who is not an agent of the party who called him,
can make an admission for the party). See generally 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17,
§ 801.22, at 163 n.1 ("An expert's statement is not an admission of the party
hiring the expert unless the court finds that the expert is an agent of the party
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2. Matters Relating to Agent's Duties
To be admissible as a non-authorized vicarious admission,
the statement must relate to matters within the scope of the
agent's duties.349 The principal, however, does not have to
approve the statement. Indeed, provided that the statement
relates to a matter within the scope of the agency, it will be
admissible even though contrary to the principal's interest, as
party admissions often are. 350
In some cases, the relationship of the statement to the
duties will be quite clear. If a law enforcement officer speaks
about a case on which she is working, the statement is a non-
authorized vicarious admission and falls within Rule
801(d)(2)(D). In State v. Smith,351 for example, the police officer
made a factual observation about a burglary that he had
investigated and for which he arrested the defendant. 352
In other instances, the question can be more difficult,
particularly in cases involving non-employee agents. In State
v. Ogden,353 for example, the defendant claimed that the
confidential informant, who set up the transaction between the
police and the defendant, actually owned the marijuana that
was delivered to the police. 354 In support of this defense, the
defendant attempted to introduce testimony that, shortly
before the transaction, the informant had said that she would
soon have money to repay a debt. 355 The court conceded that
the informant might be a government agent, but held that the
statement did not relate to matters within the scope of her
and is authorized to speak on behalf of the party.").
349. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (treating as non-hearsay "a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship").
350. See, e.g., Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (1st
Cir. 1995) (holding that a supervisor's statement reflecting discriminatory
intent was admissible even though she was not directed to speak on the topic
by the employer). See generally 3 GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 801.23, at 172 n.7
(listing cases from various circuits holding that, to constitute a vicarious
admission, all that is required is that the statement concern a matter within
the scope of agency or employment).
351. 153 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. 1967).
352. See id. at 543-44; see also United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 655-
56 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (indicating that a police officer's factual statements were
wrongly excluded as hearsay, but ultimately concluding that the error was
harmless).
353. 640 A.2d 6 (Vt. 1993).
354. See id. at 11.
355. Id.
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agency because she was not authorized to sell marijuana for
personal profit.356 Therefore, the court concluded that her
statement concerning her profit did not fall within Rule
801(d)(2)(D). 357
Ogden illustrates an overly restrictive reading of the rule.
The informant was the government's agent for purposes of
arranging the transaction; if the informant's actions
constituted entrapment of the defendant, those actions would
be imputed to the government. As a result, statements by the
informant relating to the way in which she dealt with the
defendant should be admissible, even if the agents had directed
her not to pressure the defendant and she was acting in
disregard of those instructions. If she had told the witness that
she was expecting to sell marijuana to the undercover agent, or
even that she was expecting to sell marijuana on the day of the
transaction with the defendant, the statement would be
sufficiently related to the transaction she was conducting as an
agent for the government, and therefore should be admissible.
The problem with the statement actually proffered in the trial
was that the defendant failed to connect the statement to the
transaction in question.
In State v. Jurgensen,35 8 the court also read the rule
narrowly.359  The defendant claimed that he had been
entrapped and sought to support his entrapment defense with
proof of an informant's statement.360 The law enforcement
agents who pursued the defendant had been assisted by two
confidential informants-Mowel and Guarco, the ex-husband of
the defendant. 361 The defendant's girlfriend was prepared to
testify that Mowel had told her that Guarco had offered him
$15,000 to harm the defendant and that Mowel had asked her
for $10,000 to leave the defendant alone.362  The court
356. Id. at 12.
357. Id.
358. 681 A.2d 981 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
359. Id. at 986 (concluding that "statements [that] would be admissions
binding upon an agent's principal in civil cases, are not so admissible here [in
a criminal case] as 'evidence of fact,"' and that the informant was never an
agent as he only introduced the defendant to the detective, and that phone
calls placed by the informant to the defendants would have "fallen outside the
scope of any possible agency relationship") (quoting United States v. Santos,
372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967)).
360. Id. at 984-86.
361. Id. at 984-85.
362. Id. at 985.
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concluded that even if Mowel had been an agent of the state,
this conversation fell outside the scope of the agency. 363 To the
contrary, assuming that the agency relationship was
established by a showing that the informant was cooperating
with the detective in setting up the defendant, the statement
was sufficiently related to the informant's execution of that
task that it should have been admissible against the state.
United States v. Branham364 reflects an appropriate view of
the scope of an informant's duties. The court recognized that
the informant's job, in part, was to cultivate the defendant's
trust and found that the statements from conversations
between the informant and the defendant were therefore
within the scope of the agency. 365 The court concluded that the
statements that the informant made attempting to get the
defendant involved in illegal activities should have been
admitted.366
The courts should not construe the scope of government
agents' duties restrictively. If a statement fairly relates to the
government function being performed by the agent, it should be
viewed as a vicarious admission falling under Rule
801(d)(2)(D).
D. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
Courts that decline to admit statements against the
government under Rule 801(d)(2) have raised additional
concerns and objections in various cases. These are addressed
below. Section 1 considers the line sometimes drawn between a
statement of fact and a statement of opinion, and argues that a
vicarious admission should not be excluded on the ground that
it merely states the agent's opinion. Section 2 addresses the
question of which part or parts of the government constitute
the party opponent in a criminal case for the purposes of the
party admission rule. The section concludes that the entire
Executive Branch, but only the Executive Branch, should be
regarded as the party opponent. Section 3 reviews and rejects
the argument that statements made before full investigation
363. Id. at 986.
364. 97 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1996).
365. Id. at 851; see also Sadrud-Din v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 270,
274 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting a broad range of matters that fell within the police
officer's scope of employment).
366. Branham, 97 F.3d at 851 (concluding that the trial court committed
error but that the error was harmless).
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should not be admitted as party admissions. Finally, section 4
discusses the personal knowledge requirement, concluding
that, like other party admissions, the government's party
admissions should be admitted without regard to the personal
knowledge of the speaker.
1. The Distinction Between Opinion and Fact
Some courts appear willing to apply the party admission
rule against the government in criminal cases but decline to
admit specific statements because they represent opinion
rather than fact.367 This limitation has no foundation in Rule
801(d)(2) and should be eliminated. If the statement is
relevant and otherwise satisfies the requirements of the party
admission rule, it should be admitted.368
In United States v. Zizzo, 369 the defendant attempted
unsuccessfully to introduce the prosecution's statements from
earlier proceedings that characterized two individuals, whose
statements were used against the defendant, as liars.370 The
court should have admitted the statements. Even though they
were the prosecutor's opinion, fairness requires that the jury be
told that the prosecution once condemned as untruthful the
witnesses it now relies on for its case against the defendant. 371
367. In McKeon and Salerno, the court required that the prosecutor's
inconsistent statement be one of fact in order for it to be admissible. See supra
Part III.B.2.a.i.
368. In a related argument, some contend that evidence is not admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2) unless it fits the definition of a statement found in Rule
801(a). They conclude that such evidence should not be admitted under the
rule because it is not an assertion. In fact, Rule 801(d)(2) has no role unless
the evidence is subject to exclusion as hearsay under Rule 802; Rule 801(d)(2)
only responds to a hearsay objection and only excepts the challenged evidence
from exclusion on that basis. If the challenged evidence is not a statement, it
is not hearsay-so the hearsay exceptions of Rule 801(d)(2) are irrelevant.
See, e.g., Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp 1104, 1126 n.22 (D. Del. 1994)
(refusing to accept the proposition that under Rule 801(d)(2) the agent's
statement must be an intentional assertion of fact); In re A.H. Robins Co., 575
F. Supp. 718, 728 (D. Kan. 1983) (concluding that the application of Rule
801(d)(2) is not a barrier to the admission into evidence of deposition exhibits).
369. 120 F.3d 1338 (7th Cir. 1997).
370. Id. at 1351-52.
371. But see Johnson v. State, 326 A.2d 38, 44-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974)
(holding immaterial the prosecutor's statement at a bench conference that the
prosecution had rejected the defendant's statements implicating himself), affd
per curiam, 339 A.2d 289 (Md. 1975); State v. Nichols, 388 P.2d 739, 746 (Or.
1964) (excluding the prosecutor's statement that the state could not say that
the defendant intended to kill his victim, on the ground that it was a
statement of opinion rather than fact).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, in United States v. DeLoach,372 the court noted
that the statement offered by the defendant was made during
closing argument and was not a statement of fact.373 This
distinction is not useful. The line between fact and law or fact
and opinion is often blurry. In closing argument, the
prosecution encourages the jury to adopt the prosecution's view
of the evidence and convict the defendant. If in a later case the
government pursues a different theory, the inconsistent
position on the legal and logical implications of the evidence
should be disclosed to the jury. The prosecution should not be
permitted to preclude consideration of earlier positions simply
because they were expressed during closing argument.
In civil cases, courts appear to admit statements that
qualify as opinion under Rule 801(d)(2) without special
scrutiny.374 For example, in Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock
Memorial Hospital,375 the court admitted nurses' statements
that the injured patient should have been restrained to prevent
him from getting out of bed. 376 The evidence was clear that the
patient had not been restrained, so the statements were offered
to establish the hospital had failed to exercise due care.377
Although the courts should admit some statements that
may be characterized as opinion, other statements have such
tenuous probative value that they should be excluded. In
United States v. Delgado,378 the defendant wanted to introduce
the plea agreement and guilty plea colloquy conducted when
his codefendant pleaded guilty.379 The defendant argued that
the prosecution's agreement to dismiss the conspiracy charges
against the codefendant constituted -an admission that the
codefendant was not guilty of conspiracy and should serve as
372. 34 F.3d 1001 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
373. Id. at 1005-06.
374. See, e.g., Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1990)
(upholding the admission of statements about the feeling within company
management that older employees would be replaced); United States v. D.K.G.
Appaloosas, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1540, 1564 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (affirming the
admission of government attorneys' statements of opinion in civil cases), affd,
829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987); Donnelly Corp. v. Gentex Corp., 918 F. Supp.
1126, 1135 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)
statements in affidavits that items were provided for experimental use only
and not for public use or sale).
375. 893 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1990).
376. Id. at 413.
377. See id. at 417-18.
378. 903 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1990).
379. Id. at 1499.
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evidence that the defendant was not guilty of conspiracy.380
The court appropriately rejected the evidence, commenting that
a prosecution agreement to drop charges is influenced by too
many factors to have probative value. 381  If, however, the
prosecutor appearing at the codefendant's change of plea
hearing stated the opinion that the codefendant had not
engaged in a conspiracy, that statement should constitute an
admissible party admission even though it has the character of
an opinion.38 2
2. The Government as Adverse Party: Monolith or Multiple
Entities?
The government has sometimes argued that it is not a
party opponent within the meaning of the party admission
rule.383 As the courts have recognized, there is no support for
that position in Rule 801, the Advisory Committee Notes, or in
the case law interpreting the rule.384 The more challenging
question relates to what parts of the government constitute the
party opponent in criminal cases. While there seems to be no
basis for arguing that statements emanating from the Judicial
or Legislative Branches of government should be treated as
party admissions when offered by a criminal defendant,
statements from the Executive Branch should be.
Applying the party admission rule to government
litigation, courts have recognized that the Justice Department,
as the litigation and enforcement arm of the government, is the
adversary. In United States v. Kattar,38 5 for example, the court
concluded that at least the Justice Department is the
defendant's party opponent in a criminal case.386 In United
States v. AT&T, 387 a civil antitrust action, the government
380. Id.
381. Id. (concluding that even if the evidence were relevant, it would be
excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
382. But see State v. Klosterboer, 529 N.W.2d 705, 711-12 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a prosecutor's statement that it would be difficult to prove
guilt was inadmissible because it was personal opinion).
383. See, e.g., United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1351 n.4 (7th Cir.
1997).
384. See FED. R. EVID. 801; United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130 (1st
Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
385. 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1998).
386. Id. at 130.
387. 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1980).
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acknowledged that the Justice Department was the party
opponent in the litigation for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2), while
arguing that other parts of the Executive Branch were not.388
Those parts of government immediately responsible for
criminal cases-the prosecutor's office and the law enforcement
agencies-should certainly be regarded as the party opponent
in criminal litigation. 389
The more difficult question is whether other parts of the
Executive Branch, besides the Department of Justice, qualify
as the party opponent in criminal cases. In AT&T Co.,390 the
government objected that statements of various officials of
agencies in the Executive Branch were hearsay. 39' The
government argued unsuccessfully that the party opponent was
only the Justice Department and not other parts of the
Executive Branch. 392  The court, rejecting this argument,
pointed out that an earlier ruling in the case on a discovery
question established that the entire Executive Branch
comprised "the plaintiff' in the case. 393 The court further noted
that the antitrust action protected the interests of all citizens
and had implications that were national in scope. 394
The government also tried to persuade the court that a
broad application of the party admission rule was contrary to
the policy underlying the rule. The government argued that
Rule 801(d)(2) treats statements by party-opponents as non-hearsay
(a) because the party against which the statement is being used has
no need to challenge the trustworthiness of its own statement and (b)
because that party has the ability to provide an explanation for the
statement should the need therefor [sic] arise.3 95
Because officials from different departments within the
Executive Branch "represent a variety of diverse and often
conflicting interests, and explanations of their statements at
trial could be secured by the Department of Justice only
388. Id at 358.
389. But see State v. Asbridge, 555 N.W.2d 571, 575-76 (N.D. 1996)
(concluding that statements by government investigative agents are not
admissible as party admissions); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 259, at 160-
61 (suggesting that the various policy concerns may be balanced by admitting
statements made by government attorneys once the proceeding has begun, but
excluding statements by government investigative agents).
390. 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1980).
391. Id. at 356-57 & n.6.
392. Id. at 357-58.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 357.
395. Id.
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through a massive effort," the government argued that the rule
should not apply.396 The court disagreed. Instead, it accepted
the view that the justification for admitting party admissions is
based on fairness in the adversary system and not on the
trustworthiness of the statements or the lack of burden on the
party against which they are admitted.397 The court therefore
saw no reason to limit party admissions to statements from the
Justice Department. 398
In this regard, the Executive Branch is no different in any
relevant way from a large corporation with numerous agents
operating in various aspects of the corporate business. If a
statement is made by an agent of such a large entity, it is
admissible as a non-authorized vicarious admission provided
that it relates to the agent's duties.399 Similarly, the statement
of any agent of the Executive Branch of government may be a
party admission of the government in a criminal case.
A related question arises when agents for different
governmental entities have made pertinent statements.
Investigation of criminal wrongdoing often involves law
enforcement officers from various state and local units as well
as from the federal system. In some cases, there are successive
related prosecutions in state and federal courts. The courts
need to determine which governmental units constitute the
party opponent in a criminal prosecution.
To do so, the courts should refer to the dual sovereignty
doctrine developed in applying the double jeopardy clause. If
successive prosecutions by the different units would be allowed
because they are separate sovereigns, the statement of one
should not be admissible against the other. Conversely, if the
units are not separate sovereigns, the statement of one should
be admissible against the other.
Normally, prosecution for an offense raises a double
jeopardy bar against any further prosecution for the same
offense. 400 The Court has recognized an exception, however,
when the prosecutions are brought by separate sovereigns.40 1
396. Id.
397. See id.; see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 254, at 136-37.
398. See AT&T, 498 F. Supp. at 357.
399. See supra Part III.C.
400. LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 28, § 25.1(f), at 1171.
401. Ronald J. Allen et al., The Double Jeopardy Clause, Constitutional
Interpretation and the Limits of Formal Logic, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 281, 285
(1991); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive
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Separate sovereigns vindicate separate interests through their
criminal prosecutions, and therefore should not bind one
another with their prosecutorial decisions and actions.40 2 By
contrast, however, prosecutions by different subdivisions
within a single sovereign raise a double jeopardy bar; the
interests are not separate and the subdivisions are all
accountable to the sovereign of which they are part.40 3
It makes sense to employ similar reasoning in defining the
party opponent under the party admission rule. Statements by
representatives of one sovereign should not be admissible as
the party admissions of another sovereign. Thus, for example,
if a state prosecutor makes statements concerning the case in
documents filed in court, those statements should not be
admissible if offered by the defendant in a federal prosecution
or a prosecution in another state.
On the other hand, if the declarant and the prosecutor are
agents of the same sovereign, the party admission rule should
apply. Thus, statements by federal agents are potential party
admissions in any federal prosecution. In Freeland v. United
States,40 4 the trial court rejected the defendant's effort to
introduce a statement by a prosecutor in a separate proceeding
on the ground that the United States Attorney's Office in
Virginia and the Office in the District of Columbia were not the
same party.405 The court of appeals disagreed, remarking that
the two cases were prosecuted by the same sovereign and both
prosecutors spoke for the Department of Justice. 40 6
Similarly, statements by representatives of the Executive
Branch of subdivisions of a state should be treated as party
admissions in a prosecution by the state or any subdivision of
the state. Thus, if a law enforcement officer from a
municipality within a state makes a statement related to a
case, that statement should be treated as a party admission in
Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 150
(1992) (explaining that the Court established this exception in Abbate v.
United-States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959), and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
139 (1959), and later reaffirmed this exception in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82, 88 (1985)).
402. LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 28, § 25.5, at 1191.
403. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970) (holding that
prosecution by a municipality barred prosecution by the state of which it was a
subordinate unit).
404. 631 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 1993).
405. Id. at 1191.
406. Id. at 1193.
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any prosecution brought by the state or any of its subdivisions.
In State v. Smith,40 7 for example, the defendant tried to
introduce the statement of an arresting officer. 408 The court
expressed doubt that the officer, a municipal employee, was the
agent of the state in its prosecution function.409 Since the
municipality was a subdivision of the state, however, the
statement of the municipal officer should have been regarded
as a party admission in a prosecution by the state.
3. Statements Made Before Full Investigation
One argument for excluding certain governmental
admissions is that the statements were made before full
investigation of the facts. 410 Rule 801(d)(2) contains no such
requirement and none should be created for special application
in criminal cases. If a party speaks prematurely, its words are
admissible as a party admission and the party is free to explain
to the jury why they should not credit the admission. The
government, like any other party, can explain party admissions
made early in the criminal process, telling the jury how later
investigation disclosed the error in the earlier assertion.
In some cases, a statement made before full investigation
may provide valuable insight. For example, in State v.
Smith,411 one of the officers who investigated a break-in stated,
as he arrested the defendant, that whoever committed the
crime "must have got[ten] cut. '412 The defendant, who was not
cut, wanted to introduce the statement.4 3 The statement
related to the officer's duties of investigation and should have
been treated as a party admission. It represented precisely the
type of information that the party admission rule should enable
the defendant to present. The statement reflected the informed
impression of an agent of the state responsible for investigating
the crime. Once the police focused on the defendant, pressure
may have developed to conform the official view of the facts to
407. 153 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. 1967).
408. See id. at 542-43.
409. Id. at 543.
410. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting that the trial court's refusal to admit evidence amounted to a harmless
error because the evidence was gathered in the early part of the investigation
and therefore subject to change).
411. 153 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. 1967).




the circumstances of the particular defendant and to downplay
the likelihood that the perpetrator "got cut" while breaking in.
Admitting the officer's statement would have permitted the
defendant to alert the jury to the fact that the official view was
not always the position of all involved. Such information may
have led the jury to scrutinize the prosecution's case more
carefully or even to entertain a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Brown,414 the court emphasized the timing of
the statement, holding that the affidavit submitted to obtain a
search warrant during the investigation of the case should not
be admitted against the state at trial.415 The court argued that
admitting statements made during the investigation would
have a negative impact on law enforcement by forcing police
officers to ensure that every fact was true before applying for a
warrant. 416
The court overstated this concern.417 Treating statements
as party admissions does not make them binding on the state.
Like any other party confronted with its own statement made
before adequate investigation, the prosecution can explain that
later investigation proved the earlier statement wrong.418
Brown, however, insulates the prosecution from having to
address the earlier statement at all. When a statement
supports the defendant's defense, as it did in Brown by
identifying the codefendant as the one selling drugs from their
shared apartment, the jury should be permitted to consider it.
To hold, as the New Jersey court did, that the state is not
accountable for any statements made by its agents before the
defendant is indicted deprives the defendant of important
evidence generated before law enforcement narrowed its focus
to the defendant. Governmental statements made in the
earlier stages may point away from the defendant's culpability
and provide important insight into the case.
414. 784 A.2d 1244 (N.J. 2001).
415. Id. at 1256.
416. Id. at 1257.
417. See Imwinkelried, supra note 36, at 305 (discussing the ability of the
government to effectively pursue law enforcement goals regardless of the
admissibility of statements).
418. In Brown, the prosecution could have called the confidential informant
as a witness to explain the transactions reported in the warrant application.
It could also simply have argued to the jury that the sales from the
codefendant were not inconsistent with the defendant's guilt.
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4. Rule 801(d)(2) and the Personal Knowledge Requirement
A key feature of the rule governing party admissions is
that the declarant need not have personal knowledge.
Normally, both in-court witnesses and out-of-court declarants
whose statements are admitted in evidence must have personal
knowledge of the facts they recount.419 Under Rule 602, a non-
expert witness is not competent to testify unless the court has
sufficient evidence that the witness has personal knowledge of
the matters about which the witness testifies.420 The rules
governing the admissibility of hearsay are generally read as
incorporating the requirement that the out-of-court declarant
have personal knowledge unless the requirement is specifically
excused.42' Thus, unless there is an adequate basis on which to
conclude that the declarant has personal knowledge of the facts
asserted, hearsay will be excluded even if it falls within an
exception. When a statement is admitted as a party admission,
however, the proponent is generally relieved of the obligation to
demonstrate the declarant's personal knowledge. 422  For
example, in the classic case of Reed v. McCord,423 the
defendant, who was not present when the workplace accident
that killed the plaintiffs decedent occurred, testified in a
coroner's hearing as to the cause of the accident.424 He clearly
lacked personal knowledge. His statement was nevertheless
admissible as a party admission even though it would not have
been admissible under any other hearsay exception because of
the lack of personal knowledge.425
Although the express language of the rule takes no position
on personal knowledge, the Advisory Committee alluded to "the
419. FED. R. EVID. 602.
420. Id.
421. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note ("In a hearsay situation,
the declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804
dispenses with the requirement of first hand knowledge."); see also 5
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 40, § 802.03[5] [b], at 802-12.
422. United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 32 (2d. Cir. 1984); Mahlandt v.
Wild Canid Survival & Research Ctr., Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 630-31 (8th Cir.
1978); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note; 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 40, §§ 801.30-801.31, at 801-42 to 801-60.1.
423. 54 N.E. 737 (N.Y. 1899).
424. Id. at 740.
425. The court held that "admissions by a party of any fact material to the
issue are always competent evidence against him." Id. Under the modern
Rules of Evidence, party admissions are characterized as non-hearsay, rather
than as an exception to the prohibition of hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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freedom which admissions have enjoyed ... from the restrictive
influences of the opinion rule and the rule requiring firsthand
knowledge."426 Most cases considering statements by a party's
agent have concluded that the agent's statement may be
admitted as a party admission even though the agent has not
been shown to have, or even clearly lacked, personal
knowledge.427 There is disagreement, however, concerning
whether third party admissions should be admitted even
though the declarant lacked personal knowledge, particularly
whether the statements of an agent without personal
knowledge should be admitted against the principal. Those
who argue in favor of a personal knowledge requirement
generally cite Judge Weinstein's observation that "[g]ossip does
not become reliable merely because it is heard in an office
rather than a home. '428
The role of personal knowledge on the part of the declarant
has different significance under each of the provisions of Rule
801(d)(2). The following sections examine the role of personal
knowledge for adoptive admissions, authorized admissions, and
non-authorized vicarious admissions, concluding that no
statements falling within Rule 801(d)(2) should be subject to a
personal knowledge requirement. The courts should not
impose a personal knowledge requirement for any
governmental party admissions.
a. Personal Knowledge and Adoptive Admissions
A personal knowledge requirement for adoptive admissions
could mean either that the speaker whose statement was
adopted had personal knowledge or that the agent adopting the
426. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
427. See Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Mem'l Hosp., 893 F.2d 411, 415 (1st
Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Rule 801(d)(2)(D) from other hearsay rules and
concluding that personal knowledge is not required); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 435 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that personal
knowledge is not required under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)); United States v. Ammar,
714 F.2d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that the personal
knowledge requirement applies to co-conspirators' statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(E)); Mahlandt, 588 F.2d at 630-31 (holding that personal knowledge
is not required). But see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 80, § 8.31, at
1119 (arguing that personal knowledge is required under Rule 801(d)(2)(C)).
428. See, e.g., Brookover, 893 F.2d at 416 (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(d)(2)(D)[01 at 226-27 (1988 & Supp.
1989)); Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 F.2d 785, 816 (2d Cir. 1983); In re
A.H. Robins Co., 575 F. Supp. 718, 725 (D. Kan. 1983); see also 3 GRAHAM,
supra note 17, § 801.24, at 183-88.
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statement for the government had personal knowledge. The
requirement should not be imposed in either case.429
Consider, for instance, the paradigm adoption in a criminal
case. To obtain a warrant, an agent submits an affidavit based
in part on information received from an informant or some
other witness held out to be reliable. The government thereby
adopts the statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), but the agent
who acts as affiant probably does not have personal knowledge
of the facts recounted by the informant; otherwise, the agent
would simply swear to those facts rather than endorsing the
statement of the third party. On the other hand, if the third
party spoke without personal knowledge, that should not
prevent the defendant from using the statement against the
government as an adoptive admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
To do so would allow the government to solicit judicial action on
the basis of third party statements and later disavow those
assertions on the ground that the source of the information
lacked personal knowledge.
b. Personal Knowledge and Authorized Admissions
Personal knowledge should never be required for
authorized admissions. A personal knowledge requirement is
simply inconsistent with the routine applications of this aspect
of the party admission rule. Spokespersons are rarely agents
with personal knowledge of the facts about which they speak.
A declarant authorized to speak on a matter will often speak
without personal knowledge. For example, in the government
setting, those who speak for the various departments will
generally base their assertions on collected information rather
than personal knowledge and are unlikely to be sufficiently
429. In civil cases, courts have not imposed a personal knowledge
requirement on adoptive admissions. See Wright-Simmons v. City of
Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the City
Manager's reliance on a personnel department report constituted an adoption
and that notes based on that adoption were admissible as non-hearsay under
Rule 801(d)(2)(B)); Pilgrim v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 118 F.3d 864, 870 (1st Cir.
1997) (holding that the Tufts president adopted the report of the Grievance
Committee by taking action based on its recommendations, despite his lack of
personal knowledge of the underlying facts); see also A.H. Robins, 575 F. Supp.
at 728. In A.H. Robins, the court concluded that employee statements that
incorporated the reports of third parties were admissible because the
employees made use of the reports in their daily activities. Id. The court
based its holding on Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Id. A more appropriate analysis would
be to treat the reception of, and reliance on, the third party statements as
adoptive admissions. See supra Part III.A.3.
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involved with day to day operations to have personal
knowledge. Similarly, lawyers speak with authorization, but
will rarely have personal knowledge of the underlying facts,
basing their assertions instead on others' representations and
their own investigation. An official publication will not be
based on the personal knowledge of any declarant, but
nevertheless represents the position of the government based
on information gathered from various sources.
c. Personal Knowledge and Non-Authorized Vicarious
Admissions
The courts are most concerned about the need for a
personal knowledge requirement when applying Rule
801(d)(2)(D)'s expanded definition of vicarious admissions, the
non-authorized statements of agents speaking about matters
related to their duties. Given the absence of any limiting
language in the rule and the clear directive of the Advisory
Committee, 430 such non-authorized statements should be
admissible provided that they satisfy the other requirements of
this subsection-even if the agent spoke without personal
knowledge.
Even though the rule does not require personal knowledge,
the requirements of the rule make it likely that a declarant
whose statement is admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) will have
personal knowledge. While those acting for the government in
adopting third party statements or speaking with authority for
the government may be quite removed from the matters about
which they speak, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) the agent's
statement must relate to matters falling within the scope of the
agency.43' This limitation makes it more likely that the
statement relates to matters in which the agent is sufficiently
involved to have either first hand knowledge of the facts or at
least a good basis of knowledge. The concern that tempts
courts to impose the personal knowledge requirement is the
risk that the rule will allow defendants to introduce statements
of those who are ill-informed yet speak about cases or other
matters on which they are working. The courts can protect the
government against this risk by applying the requirements of
the Rules of Evidence with care.
First, when the agent lacks personal knowledge, the courts
430. See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
431. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
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should strictly enforce the requirement that the statement
relate to a matter within scope of the agent's duties.432 At the
same time, the courts should view employees as being in the
loop as to matters within their job duties, even when they may
not have first-hand knowledge of the facts asserted. 433 The
more highly placed the agent is, the more willing the court may
be to construe their duties broadly.434  Nevertheless, if it
appears that the assignment of the government agent who is
the declarant is not sufficiently related to the topic, the court
should conclude that the statement does not fall within the
rule.435 In Stagman v. Ryan,436 for example, the court held that
an employee's statement concerning the circumstances of the
plaintiffs discharge was admissible because the employee was
responsible for disciplining the plaintiff and also wrote the
memorandum concerning the discharge. 437  As to other
statements by the same employee, however, the court
concluded that he was repeating the statements of another
employee speaking about matters not within her demonstrated
duties. The evidence therefore did not qualify as a party
admission.438
432. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 557-62
(lth Cir. 1998) (assessing the scope and boundaries of several declarants'
employment duties); Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094 (1st
Cir. 1995) (considering carefully the scope of an employee's duties); Hill v.
Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that statements
concerned matters falling outside the duties of the declarants); cf. MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 80, § 8.32, at 1132 (suggesting that the relationship
to duties requirement makes it likely that an agent has a competent basis of
knowledge).
433. Cf. Swanson v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 154 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), when an employee's supervisor makes
statements regarding reasons for firing, "the supervisor is presumed to speak
for the decision maker").
434. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1190, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (inferring that a senior official in the
company was likely to have duties relating to export, despite a lack of any
indication in the record), affd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
435. See, e.g., Krause v. City of La Crosse, 246 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that an assistant police chiefs remarks concerning the finance
department's treatment of a city employee did not relate to his job duties and
were therefore inadmissible).
436. 176 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1999).
437. Id. at 996.
438. Id. at 997; see also Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 793
F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that a letter written by lower level employee
who responded to billing questions was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
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Second, the court should scrutinize statements that reflect
multiple levels of repetition or gossip, analyzing them as
hearsay within hearsay.4 39 When evidence contains layers of
hearsay, each layer of hearsay must fall within an exception to
be admissible. 440 Thus, if the agent speaking about matters
within the scope of her duties repeats the statement of a third
party without adopting it, the third party's statement is also
subject to the hearsay rule. Unless the repeated statement
falls outside the definition of hearsay or within a hearsay
exception, it should be excluded.
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 441 the court employed
this approach to exclude under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) the notes of a
party's attorney from interviews with company employees
recounting alleged improprieties committed by other
employees. 44 2 The court concluded that there were too many
layers of hearsay and chided AT&T for failing to lay an
adequate foundation. 443 Although the attorney's notes related
to matters within the scope of the attorney's agency, AT&T had
failed to demonstrate that the interviewed employees were
speaking about matters within the scope of their duties or that
because the letter in question was within the scope of his duties).
439. See Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir.
1997) (concluding that statements reported in a party admission were
attributable to employees with authority to speak); Carden v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 850 F.2d 996, 1002 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that an employee's
statement was inadmissible under Rules 801(d)(2)(D) and 805 because it
included hearsay from an unidentified source); Union Mut., 793 F.2d at 8-9
(assessing the basis for an employee's statement and concluding it was not
based on hearsay statements); Pillsbury Co. v. Cleaver-Brooks Div. of Aqua-
Chem, Inc., 646 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that statements of
one employee repeating a statement of another that also fell within Rule
801(d)(2)(D) were admissible); Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n.,
551 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1977) (excluding a supervisor's statement
because it related a statement of an unidentified third party); Edwards v.
Schlumberger-Wells Servs., 984 F. Supp. 264, 276 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding an
employee's statement concerning what "they" would do inadmissible because it
was unclear whose statements the employee was reporting); Finch v. Hercules,
Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1126 (D. Del. 1994) (examining a party admission
containing layers of hearsay and concluding that each layer fit within the
801(d)(2)(D) hearsay exclusion).
440. FED. R. EVID. 805 ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded
under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with
an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.").
441. 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983).
442. Id. at 816.
443. Id. at 816-17.
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their statements fell within some other hearsay exception. 444 A
careful analysis of each layer of hearsay should provide
adequate protection against the risk of merely repeating gossip.
CONCLUSION
When a criminal defendant discovers that a government
agent made a statement inconsistent with the prosecution's
position in the criminal case, the defendant should be able to
introduce that statement over a hearsay objection as the
government's party admission. Rule 801(d)(2), the modern rule
defining party admissions, was written broadly and contains no
special rule for the government, either explicit or implicit. The
courts should apply the three pertinent sections of the rule to
statements offered against the government, permitting the jury
to be fully informed about the government's stance in the case
and restricting the government's freedom to talk out of both
sides of its mouth.
The courts should admit adoptive admissions against the
prosecution under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). A variety of governmental
actions manifest adoption. The government adopts statements
when it relies on their truth in documents filed with the courts.
It adopts statements when it engages in conduct which affirms
the statement, such as taking formal action on the statement.
The courts should not rely solely on adoption analysis in
evaluating statements offered by the defendant as
governmental party admissions, however. Instead, the court
should invoke the rule governing adoptive admissions only
when the statement cannot be a vicarious admission because it
was made by a third party who was not an agent of the
government.
The government acts and speaks only through its agents.
When a statement is that of a government agent, the courts
should evaluate it as a vicarious rather than an adoptive
admission. If the agent spoke with authority, the court should
apply Rule 801(d)(2)(C), which admits authorized admissions.
The most common example of an authorized admission in a
criminal case is likely to be a statement of the prosecution in a
prior case or proceeding. In addition, however, courts should
444. Id. But cf. Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Mem'l Hosp., 893 F.2d 411,
418 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that nurses employed in a hospital were not
required to have personal knowledge of the exact circumstances surrounding a
patient's fall in order for their statements made to plaintiff concerning the use
of bed restraints to be admissible in regards to the patient's fall).
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recognize that documents filed with the court, official
government publications, and internal government documents
are also authorized government statements that should be
treated as vicarious admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(C).
When the government agent spoke without authority,
courts should evaluate the statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(D),
admitting it only if it relates to matters within the scope of the
agent's duties. The Federal Rules extended the party
admission rule to treat as vicarious admissions the non-
authorized statements of an agent, provided that the statement
relates to the agent's duties. The rule should apply as written
to government agents. The courts should not refuse to apply
the rule against the government, nor should they read
protective restrictions into the rule as they apply it to the
government. Instead, if a government agent makes a
statement related to matters within the scope of the agency,
the court should treat the statement as a party admission
admissible against the prosecution.
By adopting this approach to governmental party
admissions, the courts will better protect the fairness of the
criminal justice process. A judicial stance more receptive to
admitting party admissions against the prosecution will
prevent the government from adopting inconsistent positions
without consequence. It will allow defendants to inform the
jury of the government's more favorable earlier positions and
may shed useful light on criminal cases. Most importantly, it
will make unjust convictions less likely.
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